Sign up for PayPal and start accepting credit card payments instantly.


Sixto Brillantes Jr. vs. Senate of the Philippines (FULLTEXT)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 163193. June 15, 2004]

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR. petitioner, vs. JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ, TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, petitioners-in-intervention, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is the petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., a voter and taxpayer, seeking to nullify, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 approved by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc captioned GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF ADVANCED RESULTS IN THE MAY 10, 2004 ELECTIONS.[1] The petitioner, likewise, prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and, after due proceedings, a writ of prohibition to permanently enjoin the respondent COMELEC from enforcing and implementing the questioned resolution.

After due deliberation, the Court resolved to require the respondent to comment on the petition and to require the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance by the COMELEC of the assailed resolution. The parties were heard on oral arguments on May 8, 2004. The respondent COMELEC was allowed during the hearing to make a presentation of the Electronic Transmission, Consolidation and Dissemination (PHASE III) program of the COMELEC, through Mr. Renato V. Lim of the Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI).

The Court, thereafter, resolved to maintain the status quo order issued on May 6, 2004 and expanded it to cover any and all other issuances related to the implementation of the so-called election quick count project. In compliance with the resolution of the Court, the respondent, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention submitted the documents required of them.

The Antecedents

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436[2] authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.

The COMELEC initially intended to implement the automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections, particularly in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The failure of the machines to read correctly some automated ballots, however, deferred its implementation.[3]

In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both national and local positions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had been acquired for that electoral exercise because of time constraints.

On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004 elections consisting of three (3) phases, to wit:

(1) PHASE I – Computerized system of registration and voters validation or the so-called “biometrics” system of registration;

(2) PHASE II – Computerized voting and counting of votes; and

(3) PHASE III – Electronic transmission of results.

It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases.

On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172,[4] which allocated the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004 elections.

On January 28, 2003, the COMELEC issued an Invitation to Bid[5] for the procurement of supplies, equipment, materials and services needed for the complete implementation of all three phases of the AES with an approved budget of P2,500,000,000.

On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175,[6] authorizing the release of a supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the COMELEC. The said issuance, likewise, instructed the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to ensure that the aforementioned additional amount be used exclusively for the AES prescribed under Rep. Act No. 8436, particularly “the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local elections.”[7]

On April 15, 2003, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the AES to Mega Pacific Consortium and correspondingly entered into a contract with the latter to implement the project. On the same day, the COMELEC entered into a separate contract with Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI) denominated “ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION, CONSOLIDATION & DISSEMINATION OF ELECTION RESULTS PROJECT CONTRACT.[8] The contract, by its very terms, pertains to Phase III of the respondent COMELEC’s AES modernization program. It was predicated on a previous bid award of the contract, for the lease of 1,900 units of satellite-based Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) each unit consisting of an indoor and outdoor equipment, to PMSI for possessing the legal, financial and technical expertise necessary to meet the project’s objectives. The COMELEC bound and obliged itself to pay PMSI the sum of P298,375,808.90 as rentals for the leased equipment and for its services.

In the meantime, the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (ITFP), filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court for the nullification of Resolution No. 6074 approving the contract for Phase II of AES to Mega Pacific Consortium, entitled and docketed as Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 159139. While the case was pending in this Court, the COMELEC paid the contract fee to the PMSI in trenches.

On January 13, 2004, this Court promulgated its Decision nullifying COMELEC Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the AES to Mega Pacific Consortium. Also voided was the subsequent contract entered into by the respondent COMELEC with Mega Pacific Consortium for the purchase of computerized voting/counting machines for the purpose of implementing the second phase of the modernization program. Phase II of the AES was, therefore, scrapped based on the said Decision of the Court and the COMELEC had to maintain the old manual voting and counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections.

On the other hand, the validation scheme under Phase I of the AES apparently encountered problems in its implementation, as evinced by the COMELEC’s pronouncements prior to the elections that it was reverting to the old listing of voters. Despite the scrapping of Phase II of the AES, the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement Phase III of the AES through an electronic transmission of advanced “unofficial” results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an “unofficial quick count.”

Senate President Franklin Drilon had misgivings and misapprehensions about the constitutionality of the proposed electronic transmission of results for the positions of President and Vice-President, and apprised COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos of his position during their meeting on January 28, 2004. He also wrote Chairman Abalos on February 2, 2004. The letter reads:

Dear Chairman Abalos,

This is to confirm my opinion which I relayed to you during our meeting on January 28th that the Commission on Elections cannot and should not conduct a “quick count” on the results of the elections for the positions of President and Vice-President.

Under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, it is the Congress that has the sole and exclusive authority to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. Thus, any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of the Congress, but also would be lacking of any Constitutional authority. You conceded the validity of the position we have taken on this point.

In view of the foregoing, we asked the COMELEC during that meeting to reconsider its plan to include the votes for President and Vice-President in the “quick count”, to which you graciously consented. Thank you very much.[9]

The COMELEC approved a Resolution on February 10, 2004 referring the letter of the Senate President to the members of the COMELEC and its Law Department for study and recommendation. Aside from the concerns of the Senate President, the COMELEC had to contend with the primal problem of sourcing the money for the implementation of the project since the money allocated by the Office of the President for the AES had already been spent for the acquisition of the equipment. All these developments notwithstanding, and despite the explicit specification in the project contract for Phase III that the same was functionally intended to be an interface of Phases I and II of the AES modernization program, the COMELEC was determined to carry out Phase III of the AES. On April 6, 2004, the COMELEC, in coordination with the project contractor PMSI, conducted a field test of the electronic transmission of election results.

On April 27, 2004, the COMELEC met en banc to update itself on and resolve whether to proceed with its implementation of Phase III of the AES.[10] During the said meeting, COMELEC Commissioner Florentino Tuason, Jr. requested his fellow Commissioners that “whatever is said here should be confined within the four walls of this room and the minutes so that walang masyadong problema.[11] Commissioner Tuason, Jr. stated that he had no objection as to the Phase III of the modernization project itself, but had concerns about the budget. He opined that other funds of the COMELEC may not be proper for realignment. Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Virgilio Garcillano also expressed their concerns on the budget for the project. Commissioner Manuel Barcelona, Jr. shared the sentiments of Commissioners Garcillano and Tuason, Jr. regarding personnel and budgetary problems. Commissioner Sadain then manifested that the consideration for the contract for Phase III had already been almost fully paid even before the Court’s nullification of the contract for Phase II of the AES, but he was open to the possibility of the realignment of funds of the COMELEC for the funding of the project. He added that if the implementation of Phase III would not be allowed to continue just because Phase II was nullified, then it would be P300,000,000 down the drain, in addition to the already allocated disbursement on Phase II of the AES.[12] Other concerns of the Commissioners were on the legality of the project considering the scrapping of Phase II of the AES, as well as the operational constraints related to its implementation.

Despite the dire and serious reservations of most of its members, the COMELEC, the next day, April 28, 2004, barely two weeks before the national and local elections, approved the assailed resolution declaring that it “adopts the policy that the precinct election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC, Manila.”[13] For the purpose, respondent COMELEC established a National Consolidation Center (NCC), Electronic Transmission Centers (ETCs) for every city and municipality, and a special ETC at the COMELEC, Manila, for the Overseas Absentee Voting.[14]

Briefly, the procedure for this electronic transmission of precinct results is outlined as follows:

I. The NCC shall receive and consolidate all precinct results based on the data transmitted to it by each ETC;[15]

II. Each city and municipality shall have an ETC “where votes obtained by each candidate for all positions shall be encoded, and shall consequently be transmitted electronically to the NCC, through Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) facilities.”[16] For this purpose, personal computers shall be allocated for all cities and municipalities at the rate of one set for every one hundred seventy-five (175) precincts;[17]

III. A Department of Education (DepEd) Supervisor shall be designated in the area who will be assigned in each polling center for the purpose of gathering from all Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) therein the envelopes containing the Copy 3 of the Election Returns (ER) for national positions and Copy 2 of the ER for local positions, both intended for the COMELEC, which shall be used as basis for the encoding and transmission of advanced precinct results.[18]

The assailed resolution further provides that written notices of the date, time and place of the electronic transmission of advanced precinct results shall be given not later than May 5, 2004 to candidates running for local positions, and not later than May 7, 2004 to candidates running for national positions, as well as to political parties fielding candidates, and parties, organizations/coalitions participating under the party-list system.[19]

In relation to this, Section 13 of the assailed resolution provides that the encoding proceedings were ministerial and the tabulations were “advanced unofficial results.” The entirety of Section 13, reads:

Sec. 13. Right to observe the ETC proceedings. – Every registered political party or coalition of parties, accredited political party, sectoral party/organization or coalition thereof under the party-list, through its representative, and every candidate for national positions has the right to observe/witness the encoding and electronic transmission of the ERs within the authorized perimeter.

Provided, That candidates for the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be entitled to only one common observer at the ETC.

The citizens’ arm of the Commission, and civic, religious, professional, business, service, youth and other similar organizations collectively, with prior authority of the Commission, shall each be entitled to one (1) observer. Such fact shall be recorded in the Minutes.

The observer shall have the right to observe, take note of and make observations on the proceedings of the team. Observations shall be in writing and, when submitted, shall be attached to the Minutes.

The encoding proceedings being ministerial in nature, and the tabulations being advanced unofficial results, no objections or protests shall be allowed or entertained by the ETC.

In keeping with the “unofficial” character of the electronically transmitted precinct results, the assailed resolution expressly provides that “no print-outs shall be released at the ETC and at the NCC.”[20] Instead, consolidated and per-precinct results shall be made available via the Internet, text messaging, and electronic billboards in designated locations. Interested parties may print the result published in the COMELEC web site.[21]

When apprised of the said resolution, the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), and the heads of the major political parties, namely, Senator Edgardo J. Angara of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Chairman of the Koalisyon ng mga Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Executive Committee, Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez Tan of the Aksyon Demokratiko, Frisco San Juan of the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), Gen. Honesto M. Isleta of Bangon Pilipinas, Senate President Franklin Drilon of the Liberal Party, and Speaker Jose de Venecia of the Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (CMD) and Norberto M. Gonzales of the Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas, wrote the COMELEC, on May 3, 2004 detailing their concerns about the assailed resolution:

This refers to COMELEC Resolution 6712 promulgated on 28 April 2004.

NAMFREL and political parties have the following concerns about Resolution 6712 which arose during consultation over the past week[:]

a) The Resolution disregards RA 8173, 8436, and 7166 which authorize only the citizen’s arm to use an election return for an unofficial count; other unofficial counts may not be based on an election return; Indeed, it may be fairly inferred from the law that except for the copy of the citizen’s arm, election returns may only be used for canvassing or for receiving dispute resolutions.

b) The Commission’s copy, the second or third copy of the election return, as the case may be, has always been intended to be an archived copy and its integrity preserved until required by the Commission to resolve election disputes. Only the Board of Election Inspectors is authorized to have been in contact with the return before the Commission unseals it.

c) The instruction contained in Resolution 6712, to break the seal of the envelope containing copies Nos. 2 and 3 will introduce a break in the chain of custody prior to its opening by the Commission on Election[s]. In the process of prematurely breaking the seal of the Board of Election Inspectors, the integrity of the Commission’s copy is breached, thereby rendering it void of any probative value.

To us, it does appear that the use of election returns as prescribed in Resolution 6712 departs from the letters and spirit of the law, as well as previous practice. More importantly, questions of legalities aside, the conduct of an advanced count by the COMELEC may affect the credibility of the elections because it will differ from the results obtained from canvassing. Needless to say, it does not help either that Resolution 6712 was promulgated only recently, and perceivably, on the eve of the elections.

In view of the foregoing, we respectfully request the Commission to reconsider Resolution 6712 which authorizes the use of election returns for the consolidation of the election results for the May 10, 2004 elections.[22]

The Present Petition

On May 4, 2004, the petition at bar was filed in this Court.

Jose Concepcion, Jr., Jose De Venecia, Edgardo J. Angara, Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez-Tan, Franklin M. Drilon, Frisco San Juan, Norberto M. Gonzales, Honesto M. Isleta and Jose A. Bernas, filed with this Court their Motion to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. In their petition-in-intervention, movants-petitioners urge the Court to declare as null and void the assailed resolution and permanently enjoin the respondent COMELEC from implementing the same. The Court granted the motion of the petitioners-in-intervention and admitted their petition.

In assailing the validity of the questioned resolution, the petitioner avers in his petition that there is no provision under Rep. Act No. 8436 which authorizes the COMELEC to engage in the biometrics/computerized system of validation of voters (Phase I) and a system of electronic transmission of election results (Phase III). Even assuming for the nonce that all the three (3) phases are duly authorized, they must complement each other as they are not distinct and separate programs but mere stages of one whole scheme. Consequently, considering the failed implementation of Phases I and II, there is no basis at all for the respondent COMELEC to still push through and pursue with Phase III. The petitioner essentially posits that the counting and consolidation of votes contemplated under Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8436 refers to the official COMELEC count under the fully automated system and not any kind of “unofficial” count via electronic transmission of advanced results as now provided under the assailed resolution.

The petitioners-in-intervention point to several constitutional infractions occasioned by the assailed resolution. They advance the view that the assailed resolution effectively preempts the sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. Further, as there has been no appropriation by Congress for the respondent COMELEC to conduct an “unofficial” electronic transmission of results of the May 10, 2004 elections, any expenditure for the said purpose contravenes Article VI, Section 29 (par. 1) of the Constitution.

On statutory grounds, the petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention contend that the assailed resolution encroaches upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the “unofficial” quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. It is, likewise, impugned for violating Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, relating to the requirement of notice to the political parties and candidates of the adoption of technological and electronic devices during the elections.

For its part, the COMELEC preliminarily assails the jurisdiction of this Court to pass upon the assailed resolution’s validity claiming that it was promulgated in the exercise of the respondent COMELEC’s executive or administrative power. It asserts that the present controversy involves a “political question;” hence, beyond the ambit of judicial review. It, likewise, impugns the standing of the petitioner to file the present petition, as he has not alleged any injury which he would or may suffer as a result of the implementation of the assailed resolution.

On the merits, the respondent COMELEC denies that the assailed resolution was promulgated pursuant to Rep. Act No. 8436, and that it is the implementation of Phase III of its modernization program. Rather, as its bases, the respondent COMELEC invokes the general grant to it of the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections and to promulgate rules and regulations to ensure free, orderly and honest elections by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, and Rep. Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166. The COMELEC avers that granting arguendo that the assailed resolution is related to or connected with Phase III of the modernization program, no specific law is violated by its implementation. It posits that Phases I, II and III are mutually exclusive schemes such that, even if the first two phases have been scrapped, the latter phase may still proceed independently of and separately from the others. It further argues that there is statutory basis for it to conduct an “unofficial” quick count. Among others, it invokes the general grant to it of the power “to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.” Finally, it claims that it had complied with Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, as the political parties and all the candidates of the 2004 elections were sufficiently notified of the electronic transmission of advanced election results.

The COMELEC trivializes as “purely speculative” these constitutional concerns raised by the petitioners-in-intervention and the Senate President. It maintains that what is contemplated in the assailed resolution is not a canvass of the votes but merely consolidation and transmittal thereof. As such, it cannot be made the basis for the proclamation of any winning candidate. Emphasizing that the project is “unofficial” in nature, the COMELEC opines that it cannot, therefore, be considered as preempting or usurping the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President.

The Issues

At the said hearing on May 8, 2004, the Court set forth the issues for resolution as follows:

1. Whether the petitioner and the petitioners-intervenors have standing to sue;

2. Assuming that they have standing, whether the issues they raise are political in nature over which the Court has no jurisdiction;

3. Assuming the issues are not political, whether Resolution No. 6712 is void:

(a) for preempting the sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President;

(b) for violating Art. VI, Sec. 29 (par. 1) of the 1987 Constitution that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law;”

(c) for disregarding Rep. Acts Nos. 8173, 8436 and 7166 which authorize only the citizens’ arm to use an election return for an “unofficial” count;

(d) for violation of Sec. 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, requiring not less than thirty (30) days notice of the use of new technological and electronic devices; and,

(e) for lack of constitutional or statutory basis; and,

4. Whether the implementation of Resolution No. 6712 would cause trending, confusion and chaos.

The Ruling of the Court

The issues, as earlier defined, shall now be resolved in seriatim:

The Petitioners And Petitioners-In-

Intervention Possess The Locus

Standi To Maintain The Present

Action

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[23] Since the implementation of the assailed resolution obviously involves the expenditure of funds, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing to question its validity as they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.[24] In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or where the petitioners seek to restrain the respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[25]

Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are also representatives of major political parties that have participated in the May 10, 2004 elections. On the other hand, petitioners-in-intervention Concepcion and Bernas represent the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which is the citizens’ arm authorized to conduct an “unofficial” quick count during the said elections. They have sufficient, direct and personal interest in the manner by which the respondent COMELEC would conduct the elections, including the counting and canvassing of the votes cast therein.

Moreover, the petitioners-in-intervention Drilon and De Venecia are, respectively, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, the heads of Congress which is exclusively authorized by the Constitution to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. They have the requisite standing to prevent the usurpation of the constitutional prerogative of Congress.

The Issue Raised By The

Petition Is Justiciable

Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that:

SEC. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Court does not agree with the posture of the respondent COMELEC that the issue involved in the present petition is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. As the leading case of Tañada vs. Cuenco[26] put it, political questions are concerned with “issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The issue raised in the present petition does not merely concern the wisdom of the assailed resolution but focuses on its alleged disregard for applicable statutory and constitutional provisions. In other words, that the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention are questioning the legality of the respondent COMELEC’s administrative issuance will not preclude this Court from exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent COMELEC in issuing Resolution No. 6712. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.[27] When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable – the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.[28] In the present petition, the Court must pass upon the petitioner’s contention that Resolution No. 6712 does not have adequate statutory or constitutional basis.

Although not raised during the oral arguments, another procedural issue that has to be addressed is whether the substantive issues had been rendered moot and academic. Indeed, the May 10, 2004 elections have come and gone. Except for the President and Vice-President, the newly- elected national and local officials have been proclaimed. Nonetheless, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the merits of the substantive issues for future guidance of both the bench and bar.[29] Further, it is settled rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”[30]

The Respondent COMELEC

Committed Grave Abuse Of

Discretion Amounting To Lack Or

Excess Of Jurisdiction In Issuing

Resolution No. 6712

The preliminary issues having been thus resolved, the Court shall proceed to determine whether the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed resolution.

The Court rules in the affirmative.

An administrative body or tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the matter before it; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the matter, oversteps its authority as determined by law.[31] There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of his judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[32]

First. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution provides in part:

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

As early as January 28, 2004, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon already conveyed to Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. his deep-seated concern that the respondent COMELEC could not and should not conduct any “quick count” of the votes cast for the positions of President and Vice-President. In his Letter dated February 2, 2004[33] addressed to Chairman Abalos, Senate President Drilon reiterated his position emphasizing that “any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also be lacking of any constitutional authority.”[34]

Nonetheless, in disregard of the valid objection of the Senate President, the COMELEC proceeded to promulgate the assailed resolution. Such resolution directly infringes the authority of Congress, considering that Section 4 thereof allows the use of the third copy of the Election Returns (ERs) for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, intended for the COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and transmission of advanced precinct results, and in the process, canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President, ahead of the canvassing of the same votes by Congress.

Parenthetically, even the provision of Rep. Act No. 8436 confirms the constitutional undertaking of Congress as the sole body tasked to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President. Section 24 thereof provides:

SEC. 24. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for President and Vice-President. — The Senate and the House of Representatives, in joint public session, shall compose the national board of canvassers for president and vice-president. The returns of every election for president and vice-president duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the president of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the president of the Senate shall, not later than thirty (30) days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress upon determination of the authenticity and the due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass all the results for president and vice-president by consolidating the results contained in the data storage devices submitted by the district, provincial and city boards of canvassers and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president.

The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is “unofficial,” is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes.

The COMELEC realized its folly and the merits of the objection of the Senate President on the constitutionality of the resolution that it decided not to conduct an “unofficial” quick count of the results of the elections for President and Vice-President. Commissioner Sadain so declared during the hearing:

JUSTICE PUNO:

The word you are saying that within 36 hours after election, more or less, you will be able to tell the people on the basis of your quick count, who won the election, is that it?

COMM. SADAIN:

Well, it’s not exactly like that, Your Honor. Because the fact of winning the election would really depend on the canvassed results, but probably, it would already give a certain degree of comfort to certain politicians to people rather, as to who are leading in the elections, as far as Senator down are concerned, but not to President and Vice-President.

JUSTICE PUNO:

So as far as the Senatorial candidates involved are concerned, but you don’t give this assurance with respect to the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections which are more important?

COMM. SADAIN:

In deference to the request of the Senate President and the House Speaker, Your Honor. According to them, they will be the ones canvassing and proclaiming the winner, so it is their view that we will be pre-empting their canvassing work and the proclamation of the winners and we gave in to their request.[35]

JUSTICE CALLEJO, [SR.]:

Perhaps what you are saying is that the system will minimize “dagdag-bawas” but not totally eradicate “dagdag-bawas”?

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CALLEJO, [SR.]:

Now, I heard either Atty. Bernas or Atty. Brillantes say (sic) that there was a conference between the Speaker and the Senate President and the Chairman during which the Senate President and the Speaker voice[d] their objections to the electronic transmission results system, can you share with us the objections of the two gentlemen?

COMM. SADAIN:

These was relayed to us Your Honor and their objection or request rather was for us to refrain from consolidating and publishing the results for presidential and vice-presidential candidates which we have already granted Your Honors. So, there is going to be no consolidation and no publication of the …

COMM. SADAIN:

Reason behind being that it is actually Congress that canvass that the official canvass for this and proclaims the winner.[36]

Second. The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the constitutional provision that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”[37]

By its very terms, the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election results projected under Resolution No. 6712 is “unofficial” in character, meaning “not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by the government or government body.[38] Any disbursement of public funds to implement this project is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. The use of the COMELEC of its funds appropriated for the AES for the “unofficial” quick count project may even be considered as a felony under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[39]

Irrefragably, the implementation of the assailed resolution would entail, in due course, the hiring of additional manpower, technical services and acquisition of equipment, including computers and software, among others. According to the COMELEC, it needed P55,000,000 to operationalize the project, including the encoding process.[40] Hence, it would necessarily involve the disbursement of public funds for which there must be the corresponding appropriation.

The COMELEC posited during the hearing that the 2003 General Appropriations Act has appropriated the amount needed for its “unofficial” tabulation. We quote the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing:

JUSTICE VITUG:

And you mentioned earlier something about 55 million not being paid as yet?

COMM. SADAIN:

This is an extra amount that we will be needing to operationalize.

JUSTICE VITUG:

And this has not yet been done?

COMM. SADAIN:

It has not yet been done, Your Honor.

JUSTICE VITUG:

Would you consider the funds that were authorized by you under the General Appropriations Act as capable of being used for this purpose?

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes, that’s our position, Your Honor.[41]

But then the COMELEC, through Commissioner Sadain, admitted during the said hearing that although it had already approved the assailed resolution, it was still looking for the P55,000,000 needed to operationalize the project:

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Just a clarification. You stated that you signed already the main contract for 300 million but you have not signed the 55 million supplemental contract for the encoding?

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Because you still don’t have the money for that?

COMM. SADAIN:

Well, yes, we are trying to determine where we can secure the money.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Now, the encoding is crucial; without the encoding, the entire project collapses?

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes.[42]

Inexplicably, Commissioner Sadain contradicted himself when he said that its Financial Department had already found the money, but that proper documentation was forthcoming:

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Just a clarification. You stated that you signed already the main contract for 300 million but you have not signed the 55 million supplemental contract for the encoding?

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Because you still don’t have the money for that?

COMM. SADAIN:

Well, yes, we are trying to determine where we can secure the money.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Now, the encoding is crucial; without the encoding, the entire project collapses?

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

So, you have two (2) days to look for the 55 million, you have signed the contract on the main contract and if you don’t get that 55 million, that 300 million main contract goes to waste, because you cannot encode?

COMM. SADAIN:

It’s just a matter of proper documentation, Your Honor, because I was informed by our Finance Department that the money is there.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

So, you have found the money already?

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes, Your Honor.[43]

Earlier, during the April 27, 2004 meeting of the COMELEC En Banc, the Commissioners expressed their serious concerns about the lack of funds for the project, the propriety of using the funds for Phase III of its modernization, and the possibility of realigning funds to finance the project:

Comm. Tuason:

May I just request all the parties who are in here na whatever is said here should be confined within the four walls of this room and the minutes so that walang masyadong problema.

Comm. Borra:

Sa akin lang, we respect each other’s opinion. I will not make any observations. I will just submit my own memo to be incorporated in the minutes.

Comm. Tuason:

Commissioner Borra will submit a comment to be attached to the minutes but not on the resolution. Ako naman, I will just make it on record my previous reservation. I do not have any objection as to the Phase III modernization project itself. My main concern is the budget. I would like to make it on record that the budget for Phase III should be taken from the modernization program fund because Phase III is definitely part of the modernization project. Other funds, for instance other funds to be used for national elections may not be proper for realignment. That is why I am saying that the funds to be used for Phase III should properly come from the modernization. The other reservation is that the Election Officers are now plagued with so much work such as the preparation of the list of voters and their concern in their respective areas. They were saying to me, specially so in my own region, that to burden them with another training at this point in time will make them loose (sic) focus on what they are really doing for the national elections and what they are saying is that they should not be subjected to any training anymore. And they also said that come canvassing time, their priority would be to canvass first before they prepare the certificate of votes to be fed to the encoders [to be fed to the encoders] for electronic transmission. I share the sentiments of our people in the field. That is also one of my reservations. Thank you.

Comm. Garcillano:

I also have my observations regarding the financial restraint that we are facing if the money that is going to be used for this is taken from the Phase II, I don’t think there is money left.

Comm. Borra:

There is no more money in Phase II because the budget for Phase II is 1.3 Billion. The award on the contract for Phase II project is 1.248 billion. So the remaining has been allocated for additional expenses for the technical working group and staff for Phase II.

Comm. Garcillano:

I also have one problem. We have to have additional people to man this which I think is already being taken cared of. Third is, I know that this will disrupt the canvassing that is going to be handled by our EO and Election Assistant. I do not know if it is given to somebody (inaudible)

Comm. Tuason:

Those are your reservations.

Comm. Barcelona:

As far as I am concerned, I also have my reservations because I have the same experience as Commissioner Tuason when I went to Region IX and Caraga. Our EOs and PES’ expressed apprehension over the additional training period that they may have to undergo although, they say, that if that is an order they will comply but it will be additional burden on them. I also share the concern of Commissioner Tuason with regard to the budget that should be taken from the modernization budget.

Comm. Borra:

For the minutes, my memo is already prepared. I will submit it in detail. On three counts naman yan eh – legal, second is technical/operational and third is financial.

Comm. Sadain:

Ako naman, for my part as the CIC for Phase III, we were left with no choice but to implement Phase III inasmuch as expenses has already been incurred in Phase III to the tune of almost 100% at the time when the Phase II contract was nullified. So if we stop the implementation of Phase III just because Phase II was nullified, which means that there would be no consolidation and accounting – consolidation for the machines, then it would be again 300 million pesos down the drain. Necessarily there would be additional expense but we see this as a consequence of the loss of Phase II. I share the view of Comm. Tuason that as much as possible this should be taken from the modernization fund as much as this is properly modernization concern. However, I would like to open myself to the possibility na in case wala talaga, we might explore the possibility of realigning funds although that might not …(inaudible). Now with regards the legality, I think what Commissioner Borra has derived his opinion but I would like to think the legality issue must have been settled already as early as when we approved the modernization program involving all three phases although we also grant the benefit of the argument for Commissioner Borra if he thinks that there is going to be a legal gap for the loss of Phase II. With regards the concern with the Election Officers, I also share the same concern. In fact, on this matter alone, we try to make the GI as simple as possible so that whatever burden we will be giving to the EOs and EAs will be minimized. As in fact, we will be recommending that the EOs will no longer be bothered to attend the training. They can probably just sit in for the first hour and then they can go on with their normal routine and then leave the encoders as well as the reception officers to attend the training because there (sic) are the people who will really be doing the ministerial, almost mechanical, work of encoding and transmitting the election results. Yun lang.[44]

We have reviewed Rep. Act No. 9206, the General Appropriations Act, which took effect on April 23, 2003 and find no appropriation for the project of the COMELEC for electronic transmission of “unofficial” election results. What is appropriated therein is the amount of P225,000,000 of the capital outlay for the modernization of the electoral system.

B. PROJECTS

Maintenance & Other Operating Expenses

Capital Outlays

Total

I. Locally-Funded Projects

a. For the Modernization of Electoral System

225,000,000

225,000,000

b. FY 2003 Preparatory Activities for National Elections

250,000,000

250,000,000

c. Upgrading of Voters’ Database

125,000,000

125,000,000

d. Conduct of Special Election to

fill the vacancy in the Third District

of Cavite

6,500,000

6,500,000

e. Implementation of Absentee

Voting Act of 2003 (RA 9189)

300,000,000

==========

=========

300,000,000

==========

Sub-Total, Locally-Funded Projects

681,500,000

225,000,000

300,000,000

Under paragraph 3 of the special provisions of Rep. Act No. 9206, the amount of P225,000,000 shall be used primarily for the establishment of the AES prescribed under Rep. Act No. 8436, viz:

3. Modernization of Electoral System. The appropriations herein authorized for the Modernization of the Electoral System in the amount of Two Hundred Twenty-Five Million Pesos (P225,000,000.00) shall be used primarily for the establishment of the automated election system, prescribed under Republic Act No. 8436, particularly for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local elections.[46]

Section 52 of Rep. Act No. 9206 proscribes any change or modification in the expenditure items authorized thereunder. Thus:

Sec. 52. Modification of Expenditure Components. Unless specifically authorized in this Act, no change or modification shall be made in the expenditure items in this Act and other appropriations laws unless in cases of augmentation from savings in appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Neither can the money needed for the project be taken from the COMELEC’s savings, if any, because it would be violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5)[47] of the 1987 Constitution.

The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.[48] In this case, no law has, thus, far been enacted authorizing the respondent COMELEC to transfer savings from another item in its appropriation, if there are any, to fund the assailed resolution. No less than the Secretary of the Senate certified that there is no law appropriating any amount for an “unofficial” count and tabulation of the votes cast during the May 10, 2004 elections:

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that per records of the Senate, Congress has not legislated any appropriation intended to defray the cost of an unofficial count, tabulation or consolidation of the votes cast during the May 10, 2004 elections.

May 11, 2004. Pasay City, Philippines.

What is worrisome is that despite the concerns of the Commissioners during its En Banc meeting on April 27, 2004, the COMELEC nevertheless approved the assailed resolution the very next day. The COMELEC had not executed any supplemental contract for the implementation of the project with PMSI. Worse, even in the absence of a certification of availability of funds for the project, it approved the assailed resolution.

Third. The assailed resolution disregards existing laws which authorize solely the duly-accredited citizens’ arm to conduct the “unofficial” counting of votes. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173,[49] and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,[50] the accredited citizen’s arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an “unofficial” counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an “unofficial” count. In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the aforementioned laws, are not intended for undertaking an “unofficial” count. The aforesaid COMELEC copies are archived and unsealed only when needed by the respondent COMELEC to verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that may be imminent. However, in contravention of the law, the assailed Resolution authorizes the so-called Reception Officers (RO), to open the second or third copy intended for the respondent COMELEC as basis for the encoding and transmission of advanced “unofficial” precinct results. This not only violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an “unofficial” count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the election returns, as well as the returns themselves, by creating a gap in its chain of custody from the Board of Election Inspectors to the COMELEC.

Fourth. Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and election devices for “unofficial” tabulations of votes. Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices. Section 52(i) reads:

SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. – In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall :

(i) Prescribe the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose: Provided, That the Commission shall notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.

From the clear terms of the above provision, before the COMELEC may resort to and adopt the latest technological and electronic devices for electoral purposes, it must act in accordance with the following conditions:

(a) Take into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose; and,

(b) Notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.

It is quite obvious that the purpose of this provision is to accord to all political parties and all candidates the opportunity to object to the effectiveness of the proposed technology and devices, and, if they are so minded not to object, to allow them ample time to field their own trusted personnel especially in far flung areas and to take other necessary measures to ensure the reliability of the proposed electoral technology or device.

As earlier pointed out, the assailed resolution was issued by the COMELEC despite most of the Commissioners’ apprehensions regarding the legal, operational and financial impediments thereto. More significantly, since Resolution No. 6712 was made effective immediately a day after its issuance on April 28, 2004, the respondent COMELEC could not have possibly complied with the thirty-day notice requirement provided under Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code. This indubitably violates the constitutional right to due process of the political parties and candidates. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) concedes this point, as it opines that “the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates should have been notified of the adoption of the electronic transmission of election returns nationwide at the latest on April 7, 2004, April 8 and 9 being Holy Thursday and Good Friday, pursuant to Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code.”[51] Furthermore, during the hearing on May 18, 2004, Commissioner Sadain, who appeared for the COMELEC, unabashedly admitted that it failed to notify all the candidates for the 2004 elections, as mandated by law:

JUSTICE CARPIO:

You stated that you have notified in writing all the political parties and candidates as required in Section 52 (i)?

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Now, how many candidates are there nationwide now?

COMM. SADAIN:

I must admit you Honor we were not able to notify the candidates but we notified the politicians.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Yes, but what does the law state? Read the law please.

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes, Your Honor. I understand that it includes candidates.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

And there are how many candidates nationwide running in this election?

COMM. SADAIN:

Hundreds of thousands, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Hundreds of thousands, so you mean you just notified the political parties not the candidates?

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

And you think that is substantial compliance, you would notify how many political parties as against hundreds of thousands of candidates?

COMM. SADAIN:

Yes, Your Honor, we notified the major political parties, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Only the major political parties?

COMM. SADAIN:

Including party list?

JUSTICE CARPIO:

But not the candidates, individual candidates?

COMM. SADAIN:

We were not able to do that, Your Honor, I must admit.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

So, you did not notify hundreds of thousands of candidates?

COMM. SADAIN:

No, Your Honors.[52]

The respondent COMELEC has, likewise, failed to submit any resolution or document to prove that it had notified all political parties of the intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712, in compliance with Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code. This notwithstanding the fact that even long before the issuance of the assailed resolution, it had admittedly entered into a contract on April 15, 2003[53] and acquired facilities pertaining to the implementation of the electronic transmission and official tabulation of election results. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners-in-intervention, the invitations dated January 15, 2004 regarding the January 20, 2004 COMELEC Conference with the political parties on election security measures did not mention electronic transmission of advanced results, much less the formal adoption of the purpose of the conference. Such “notices” merely invited the addressee thereof or its/his authorized representative to a conference where the COMELEC would show a sample of the official ballot to be used in the elections, discuss various security measures that COMELEC had put in place, and solicit suggestions to improve the administration of the polls.[54] Further, the invitations purportedly sent out to the political parties regarding the April 6, 2004 Field Test of the Electronic Transmission, Consolidation and Dissemination System to be conducted by the COMELEC appear to have been sent out in the late afternoon of April 5, 2004, after office hours. There is no showing that all the political parties attended the Field Test, or received the invitations. More importantly, the said invitations did not contain a formal notice of the adoption of a technology, as required by Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code.[55]

Fifth. The assailed resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis. That respondent COMELEC is the sole body tasked to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall”[56] and to ensure “free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections”[57] is beyond cavil. That it possesses the power to promulgate rules and regulations in the performance of its constitutional duties is, likewise, undisputed. However, the duties of the COMELEC under the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 7166, and other election laws are carried out, at all times, in its official capacity. There is no constitutional and statutory basis for the respondent COMELEC to undertake a separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically. Indeed, by conducting such “unofficial” tabulation of the results of the election, the COMELEC descends to the level of a private organization, spending public funds for the purpose. Besides, it is absurd for the COMELEC to conduct two kinds of electoral counts – a slow but “official” count, and an alleged quicker but “unofficial” count, the results of each may substantially differ.

Clearly, the assailed resolution is an implementation of Phase III of the modernization program of the COMELEC under Rep. Act No. 8436. Section 2 of the assailed resolution expressly refers to the Phase III-Modernization Project of the COMELEC. Since this Court has already scrapped the contract for Phase II of the AES, the COMELEC cannot as yet implement the Phase III of the program. This is so provided in Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8436.

SEC. 6. Authority to Use an Automated Election System. — To carry out the above-stated policy, the Commission on Elections, herein referred to as the Commission, is hereby authorized to use an automated election system, herein referred to as the System, for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local elections: Provided, however, That for the May 11, 1998 elections, the System shall be applicable in all areas within the country only for the positions of president, vice-president, senators and parties, organizations or coalitions participating under the party-list system.

To achieve the purpose of this Act, the Commission is authorized to procure by purchase, lease or otherwise, any supplies, equipment, materials and services needed for the holding of the elections by an expedited process of public bidding of vendors, suppliers or lessors: Provided, That the accredited political parties are duly notified of and allowed to observe but not to participate in the bidding. If in spite of its diligent efforts to implement this mandate in the exercise of this authority, it becomes evident by February 9, 1998 that the Commission cannot fully implement the automated election system for national positions in the May 11, 1998 elections, the elections for both national and local positions shall be done manually except in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) where the automated election system shall be used for all positions.

The AES provided in Rep. Act No. 8436 constitutes the entire “process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local elections” corresponding to the Phase I, Phase II and Phase III of the AES of the COMELEC. The three phases cannot be effected independently of each other. The implementation of Phase II of the AES is a condition sine qua non to the implementation of Phase III. The nullification by this Court of the contract for Phase II of the System effectively put on hold, at least for the May 10, 2004 elections, the implementation of Phase III of the AES.

Sixth. As correctly observed by the petitioner, there is a great possibility that the “unofficial” results reflected in the electronic transmission under the supervision and control of the COMELEC would significantly vary from the results reflected in the COMELEC official count. The latter follows the procedure prescribed by the Omnibus Election Code, which is markedly different from the procedure envisioned in the assailed resolution.

Under the Omnibus Election Code, after the votes are cast and the polls closed, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) for each precinct is enjoined to publicly count the votes and record the same simultaneously on the tally boards and on two sets of ERs. Each set of the ER is prepared in eight (8) copies. After the ERs are accomplished, they are forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC), which would canvass all the ERs and proclaim the elected municipal officials. All the results in the ERs are transposed to the statements of votes (SOVs) by precinct. These SOVs are then transferred to the certificates of canvass (COCs) which are, in turn, brought to the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC). Subsequently, the PBC would canvass all the COCs from various municipalities and proclaim the elected provincial officials, including those to the House of Representatives. The PBC would then prepare two sets of Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOCs). One set is forwarded to Congress for its canvassing of the results for the President and Vice-President. The other set is forwarded to the COMELEC for its canvassing of the results for Senators.

As the results are transposed from one document to another, and as each document undergoes the procedure of canvassing by various Boards of Canvassers, election returns and certificates of canvass are objected to and at times excluded and/or deferred and not tallied, long after the pre-proclamation controversies are resolved by the canvass boards and the COMELEC.

On the other hand, under the assailed resolution, the precinct results of each city and municipality received by the ETCs would be immediately electronically transmitted to the NCC. Such data, which have not undergone the process of canvassing, would expectedly be dissimilar to the data on which the official count would be based.

Resultantly, the official and unofficial canvass, both to be administered by the respondent COMELEC, would most likely not tally. In the past elections, the “unofficial” quick count conducted by the NAMFREL had never tallied with that of the official count of the COMELEC, giving rise to allegations of “trending” and confusion. With a second “unofficial” count to be conducted by the official election body, the respondent COMELEC, in addition to its official count, allegations of “trending,” would most certainly be aggravated. As a consequence, the electoral process would be undermined.

The only intimated utility claimed by the COMELEC for the “unofficial” electronic transmission count is to avert the so-called “dagdag-bawas.” The purpose, however, as the petitioner properly characterizes it, is a total sham. The Court cannot accept as tenable the COMELEC’s profession that from the results of the “unofficial” count, it would be able to validate the credibility of the official tabulation. To sanction this process would in effect allow the COMELEC to preempt or prejudge an election question or dispute which has not been formally brought before it for quasi-judicial cognizance and resolutions.

Moreover, the Court doubts that the problem of “dagdag-bawas” could be addressed by the implementation of the assailed resolution. It is observed that such problem arises because of the element of human intervention. In the prevailing set up, there is human intervention because the results are manually tallied, appreciated, and canvassed. On the other hand, the electronic transmission of results is not entirely devoid of human intervention. The crucial stage of encoding the precinct results in the computers prior to the transmission requires human intervention. Under the assailed resolution, encoding is accomplished by employees of the PMSI. Thus, the problem of “dagdag-bawas” could still occur at this particular stage of the process.

As it stands, the COMELEC “unofficial” quick count would be but a needless duplication of the NAMFREL “quick” count, an illegal and unnecessary waste of government funds and effort.

Conclusion

The Court is mindful of the salutary goals that the respondent COMELEC had envisioned in promulgating the assailed resolution, to wit: [t]o renew the public’s confidence in the Philippine Electoral System by:

1. Facilitating transparency in the process;

2. Ensuring the integrity of the results;

3. Reducing election results manipulation;

4. Providing timely, fast and accurate information to provide the public re election results;

5. Enabling the validation of its own official count and other counts;

6. Having an audit trail in its own account.[58]

Doubtless, these are laudable intentions. But the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.[59]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Vitug, and Corona, JJ., on official leave.

Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

[1] Annex “A;” Rollo, pp. 105-117.

[2] AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

[3] Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832 (1999).

[4] DIRECTING THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO ALLOCATE FUNDS FOR AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM FOR THE MAY 10, 2004 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES.

[5] INVITATION TO APPLY FOR ELIGIBILITY AND TO BID

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC), pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act Nos. 8189 and 8436, invites interested offerors, vendors, suppliers or lessors to apply for eligibility and to bid for the procurement by purchase, lease, lease with option to purchase, or otherwise, supplies, equipment, materials and services needed for a comprehensive Automated Election System, consisting of three (3) phases: (a) registration/verification of voters, (b) automated counting and consolidation of votes, and (c) electronic transmission of election results, with an approved budget of TWO BILLION FIVE HUNDRED MILLION (Php2,500,000,000) Pesos.

Only bids from the following entities shall be entertained :

a. Duly licensed Filipino citizens/proprietorships;

b. Partnerships duly organized under the laws of the Philippines and of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the interest belongs to citizens of the Philippines;

c. Corporations duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, and of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the outstanding capital stock belongs to citizens of the Philippines;

d. Manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves into a joint venture, i.e., a group of two (2) or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that intend to be, jointly and severally, responsible or liable for a particular contract, provided that Filipino ownership thereof shall be at least sixty percent (60%); and

e. Cooperatives duly registered with the Cooperatives Development Authority.

Bid documents for the three (3) phases may be obtained starting 10 February 2003, during office hours from the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) Secretariat/Office of Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra, 7th Floor, Palacio del Governador, Intramuros, Manila, upon payment at the Cash Division, Commission on Elections, in cash or cashier’s check, payable to the Commission on Elections, of a non-refundable amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) for each phase. For this purpose, interested offerors, vendors, suppliers or lessors have the option to participate in any or all of the three (3) phases of the comprehensive Automated Election System.

A Pre-Bid Conference is scheduled on 13 February 2003, at 9:00 a.m. at the Session Hall, Commission on Elections, Postigo Street, Intramuros, Manila. Should there be questions on the bid documents, bidders are required to submit their queries in writing to the BAC Secretariat prior to the scheduled Pre-Bid Conference.

Deadline for submission to the BAC of applications for eligibility and bid envelopes for the supply of the comprehensive Automated Election System shall be at the Session Hall, Commission on Elections, Postigo Street, Intramuros, Manila on 28 February 2003 at 9:00 a.m.

The COMELEC reserves the right to review the qualifications of the bidders after the bidding and before the contract is executed. Should such review uncover any misrepresentation made in the eligibility statements, or any changes in the situation of the bidder to materially downgrade the substance of such statements, the COMELEC shall disqualify the bidder upon due notice without any obligation whatsoever for any expenses or losses that may be incurred by it in the preparation of its bid. (Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, citing Annex “7” of the Comment of Private Respondents MPC and MPEI therein, Rollo, Vol. II, p. 638.)

[6] DIRECTING THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO ALLOCATE THE ADDITIONAL AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED MILLION PESOS FOR AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM FOR THE MAY 10, 2004 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES.

[7] Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 8436.

[8] Annex “A” of the respondent COMELEC’s Supplemental Compliance dated May 11, 2004; Rollo, pp. 277-294.

[9] Rollo, p. 252.

[10] Infra.

[11] Rollo, p. 164.

[12] Id. at 167.

[13] Section 1, Resolution No. 6712.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Section 2.

[16] Section 3.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Section 4.

[19] Section 6 (Underscoring supplied).

[20] Section 18.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Rollo, pp. 118-119.

[23] Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 cited in, among others, Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 and 155661.

[24] Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., 346 SCRA 485 (2000).

[25] Ibid.

[26] 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).

[27] Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles vs. Home Development Mutual Fund, 333 SCRA 777 (2000).

[28] Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, supra.

[29] Acop v. Guingona, Jr., 383 SCRA 577 (2002).

[30] Ibid.

[31] Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647 (1997).

[32] Malinias v. Commission on Elections, 390 SCRA 480 (2002).

[33] Supra.

[34] Rollo, p. 240.

[35] TSN, 8 May 2004, pp. 382-383.

[36] Id. at 260-263 (Underscoring supplied).

[37] Par. 1, Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution.

[38] Webster New International Dictionary, 1993 Ed., p. 2505.

[39] ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.— Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed Two Hundred Pesos.

2) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

3) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than 6,000 pesos but is less than 12,000 pesos.

4) The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than 12,000 pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly-authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.

[40] TSN, 8 May 2004, pp. 367-368.

[41] Id. at 367-368.

[42] Id. at 368-370.

[43] Id. at 370.

[44] Rollo, pp. 164-168 (Underscoring supplied).

[45] Official Gazette, Vol. 99, No. 19.

[46] Id. at 661.

[47] Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution reads:

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

[48] Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990).

[49] SEC. 27. Number of Copies of Election Returns and Their Distribution. – The board of election inspectors shall prepare in handwriting the election returns in their respective polling places, in the number of copies herein provided and in the form to be prescribed and provided by the Commission.

The copies of the election returns shall be distributed as follows :

(a) In the election of President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives :

(3) the third copy, to the Commission;

(6) The sixth copy, to a citizens’ arm authorized by the Commission to conduct an unofficial count: Provided, however, That the accreditation of the citizens’ arm shall be subject to the provisions of Section 52(k) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and

(b) In the election of local officials:

(3) the third copy, to the Provincial Board of Canvassers;

(6) The sixth copy, to a citizens’ arm authorized by the Commission to conduct an unofficial count: Provided, however, That the accreditation of the citizens’ arm shall be subject to the provisions of Section 52(k) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; …

[50] SEC. 18. Election Returns. – After the ballots of the precincts have been counted, the election officer or any official authorized by the Commission shall, in the presence of watchers and representatives of the accredited citizens’ arm, political parties/candidates, if any, store the results in a data storage device and print copies of the election returns of each precinct. The printed election returns shall be signed and thumbmarked by the fourth member and COMELEC authorized representative. The Chairman of the Board shall then publicly read and announce the total number of votes obtained by each candidate based on the election returns. Thereafter, the copies of the election returns shall be sealed and placed in the proper envelopes for distribution as follows:

A. In the election of president, vice president, senators and party-list system:

(3) the third copy, to the Commission;

(4) the fourth copy, to the citizens’ arm authorized by the Commission to conduct an unofficial count. In the conduct of the unofficial quick count by any accredited citizens’ arm, the Commission shall promulgate rules and regulations to ensure, among others, that said citizens’ arm releases in the order of their arrival one hundred percent (100%) results of a precinct indicating the precinct, municipality or city, province and region: Provided, however, That, the count shall continue until all precincts shall have been reported; …

B. In the election of local officials and members of the House of Representatives :

(3) the third copy, to the Commission;

(4) the fourth copy, to the citizens’ arm authorized by the Commission to conduct an unofficial count. In the conduct of the unofficial quick count by any accredited citizens’ arm, the Commission shall promulgate rules and regulations to ensure, among others, that said citizens’ arm releases in the order of their arrival one hundred percent (100%) results of a precinct indicating the precinct, municipality or city, province and region: Provided, however, That, the count shall continue until all precincts shall have been reported; …

[51] Rollo, p. 270.

[52] TSN, 8 May 2004, pp. 343-346.

[53] Rollo, p. 278.

[54] Annexes “2” to “32”; Rollo, pp. 208-232.

[55] Annexes “33” to “40”; Id. at 233-240.

[56] Section 2(1), Article IX.

[57] Section 2(4), Article IX.

[58] 2004 National and Local Elections: Consolidation and Dissemination of Results, Presentation of the respondent COMELEC during the Oral Arguments on May 8, 2004.

[59] Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 (2000).

Romulo Macalintal vs. Comelec (FULLTEXT)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003]

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)[1] suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition.

R.A. No. 9189, entitled, “An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,” appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.[2] The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds[3] because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.[4]

The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people. This has been explicitly pronounced in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan,[5] where the Court held:

Objections to taxpayers’ suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.[6]

Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.

The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be visited by the vice of prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions as required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dims in light of the importance of the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner. In Tañada vs. Angara,[7] the Court held:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.” Once a “controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.”

In another case of paramount impact to the Filipino people, it has been expressed that it is illogical to await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution.[8] In yet another case, the Court said that:

. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate “to make the hammer fall heavily,” where the acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the people’s will as expressed in the Constitution . . .[9]

The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court resolves the instant petition[10] and determine whether Congress has acted within the limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it.[11]

The petitioner raises three principal questions:

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?

B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?

C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

The Court will resolve the questions in seriatim.

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines?

Section 5(d) provides:

Sec. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

. . . . . . . . .

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals[12] to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a “green card” holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.

Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise;[13] that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote.[14] He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

Respondent COMELEC refrained from commenting on this issue.[15]

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, the Solicitor General filed his comment for all public respondents. He contraposes that the constitutional challenge to Section 5(d) must fail because of the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that said provision of law is repugnant to the Constitution. He stresses: All laws are presumed to be constitutional; by the doctrine of separation of powers, a department of government owes a becoming respect for the acts of the other two departments; all laws are presumed to have adhered to constitutional limitations; the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law.

In addition, the Solicitor General points out that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is a verbatim reproduction of those provided for in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions. Thus, he cites Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives[16] wherein the Court held that the term “residence” has been understood to be synonymous with “domicile” under both Constitutions. He further argues that a person can have only one “domicile” but he can have two residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the other temporary;[17] and that the definition and meaning given to the term residence likewise applies to absentee voters. Invoking Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC[18] which reiterates the Court’s ruling in Faypon vs. Quirino,[19] the Solicitor General maintains that Filipinos who are immigrants or permanent residents abroad may have in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile.[20]

Taking issue with the petitioner’s contention that “green card” holders are considered to have abandoned their Philippine domicile, the Solicitor General suggests that the Court may have to discard its ruling in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals[21] in so far as it relates to immigrants and permanent residents in foreign countries who have executed and submitted their affidavits conformably with Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. He maintains that through the execution of the requisite affidavits, the Congress of the Philippines with the concurrence of the President of the Republic had in fact given these immigrants and permanent residents the opportunity, pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the Constitution, to manifest that they had in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile; that indubitably, they would have formally and categorically expressed the requisite intentions, i.e., “animus manendi” and “animus revertendi;” that Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad possess the unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution upon approval of their registration, conformably with R.A. No. 9189.[22]

The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is given to the phrase, “qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad” as it appears in R.A. No. 9189, to wit:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the prime duty of the State to provide a system of honest and orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. Towards this end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad in the exercise of this fundamental right.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act:

a) “Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad, exercise their right to vote;

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

f) “Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives. (Emphasis supplied)

in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the Constitution which read:

SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration under said Act.

Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to vote. He focuses solely on Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2 empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and abandoned the Philippines to live permanently in their host countries and therefore, a provision in the law enfranchising those who do not possess the residency requirement of the Constitution by the mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intent to return to the Philippines within a given period, risks a declaration of unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more apparent than real.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.[23] Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta vs. COMELEC, the Court said:

. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself.[24]

Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly:

. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.[25]

As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon,[26] the Court held that a constitutional provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest.[27] The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers through their debates in the constitutional convention.[28]

R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the Constitution.

To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell first on the significance of absentee voting. The concept of absentee voting is relatively new. It is viewed thus:

The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct from the regular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of voting from that previously known, and an exception to the customary and usual manner of voting. The right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory; absentee voting was unknown to, and not recognized at, the common law.

Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economic conditions devised to accommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties make it impracticable for them to attend their polling places on the day of election, and the privilege of absentee voting may flow from constitutional provisions or be conferred by statutes, existing in some jurisdictions, which provide in varying terms for the casting and reception of ballots by soldiers and sailors or other qualified voters absent on election day from the district or precinct of their residence.

Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute right. When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate with equality among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature may be limited in their application to particular types of elections. The statutes should be construed in the light of any constitutional provisions affecting registration and elections, and with due regard to their texts prior to amendment and to predecessor statutes and the decisions thereunder; they should also be construed in the light of the circumstances under which they were enacted; and so as to carry out the objects thereof, if this can be done without doing violence to their provisions and mandates. Further, in passing on statutes regulating absentee voting, the court should look to the whole and every part of the election laws, the intent of the entire plan, and reasons and spirit of their adoption, and try to give effect to every portion thereof.[29] (Emphasis supplied)

Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee.[30] However, under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile.

In Romualdez-Marcos,[31] the Court enunciated:

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that “[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence.” In Ong vs. Republic, this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual’s “permanent home,” “a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:

“There is a difference between domicile and residence. ‘Residence’ is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; ‘domicile’ denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.”

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.[32] (Emphasis supplied)

Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting, thus:

MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of suffrage, which here has a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens temporarily residing or working abroad. Based on the statistics of several government agencies, there ought to be about two million such Filipinos at this time. Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out that these provisions are really lifted from the two previous Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, with the exception of the last paragraph. They could not therefore have foreseen at that time the phenomenon now described as the Filipino labor force explosion overseas.

According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract workers and employees, and although the major portions of these expatriate communities of workers are to be found in the Middle East, they are scattered in 177 countries in the world.

In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said that there was no insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage for Filipinos overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino citizenship notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to embrace a more convenient foreign citizenship. And those who on their own or under pressure of economic necessity here, find that they have to detach themselves from their families to work in other countries with definite tenures of employment. Many of them are on contract employment for one, two, or three years. They have no intention of changing their residence on a permanent basis, but are technically disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage in their countries of destination by the residential requirement in Section 1 which says:

Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election.

I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might entertain an amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote abroad for Filipino citizens an effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this proposed Constitution.

FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than just saying that, I would like to make a comment on the meaning of “residence” in the Constitution because I think it is a concept that has been discussed in various decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a 1954 case which dealt precisely with the meaning of “residence” in the Election Law. Allow me to quote:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the saying goes, to improve his lot and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, reengaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may decide to return to his native town, to cast his ballot, but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of his professional or business activities.

So, they are here registered as voters as he has the qualifications to be one, and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him.

This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to consider abandonment or loss of such residence of origin.

In other words, “residence” in this provision refers to two residence qualifications: “residence” in the Philippines and “residence” in the place where he will vote. As far as residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word “residence” means domicile, but as far as residence in the place where he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems to be different. He could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he is a resident of a place for six months and he is allowed to vote there. So that there may be serious constitutional obstacles to absentee voting, unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast in the place of his domicile.

MR. OPLE. Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.

It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who should enjoy the right of suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these overseas Filipino communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that when this Article of the Constitution explicitly and unequivocally extends the right of effective suffrage to Filipinos abroad, this will call for a logistical exercise of global proportions. In effect, this will require budgetary and administrative commitments on the part of the Philippine government, mainly through the COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of this mechanism that will be put in place to make effective the right to vote. Therefore, seeking shelter in some wise jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient to meet the demands of the right of suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have mentioned. But I want to thank the Committee for saying that an amendment to this effect may be entertained at the proper time. . . . . . . . . .

[33] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no small measure to the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as the choice of this country’s leaders is concerned.

The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and considering the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems especially because the Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters:

MR. REGALADO. Before I act on that, may I inquire from Commissioner Monsod if the term “absentee voting” also includes transient voting; meaning, those who are, let us say, studying in Manila need not go back to their places of registration, for instance, in Mindanao, to cast their votes.

MR. MONSOD. I think our provision is for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad.

MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot go back to the places where they are registered?

MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are provisions for allowing students and military people who are temporarily in another place to register and vote. I believe that those situations can be covered by the Omnibus Election Code. The reason we want absentee voting to be in the Constitution as a mandate to the legislature is that there could be inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a question of legislation by Congress. So, by allowing it and saying that this is possible, then legislation can take care of the rest.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting.

The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect of the residency requirement prescribed by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution on the proposed system of absentee voting for qualified Filipinos abroad is enlightening:

MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There are certain qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the elections. What is the effect of these mandatory requirements on the matter of the exercise of the right of suffrage by the absentee voters like Filipinos abroad?

THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?

MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given by Commissioner Bernas, that the domicile requirements as well as the qualifications and disqualifications would be the same.

THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise the system?

FR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem raised there.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.

FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified with regard to the residence requirement or the place where they vote in practice; the understanding is that it is flexible. For instance, one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but he satisfies the requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to vote in Manila.

MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest to the Committee to change the word “Filipinos” to QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of “VOTING BY FILIPINOS ABROAD,” it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the Committee wants QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING ABROAD, would that not satisfy the requirement?

THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod say?

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase “QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD” because “QUALIFIED” would assume that he has the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote.

MR. TINGSON. That is right. So does the Committee accept?

FR. BERNAS. “QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD”?

THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?

MR. REGALADO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read my proposed amendment, I specifically stated that the National Assembly shall prescribe a system which will enable qualified citizens, temporarily absent from the Philippines, to vote. According to Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase “absentee voting” already took that into account as its meaning. That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens temporarily abroad.

MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect to registration we will leave it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to require where the registration is. If it is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who may be continuously abroad for a long time, perhaps, there can be a system of registration in the embassies. However, we do not like to preempt the legislative assembly.

THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsod’s amendment is only to provide a system.

MR. MONSOD. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he wants new qualifications for these absentee voters.

MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.

MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.[35] (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This is in fact the reason why the Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the system of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the “qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote.” In fine-tuning the provision on absentee voting, the Constitutional Commission discussed how the system should work:

MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for the record that in the case of qualified Filipino citizens residing abroad and exercising their right of suffrage, they can cast their votes for the candidates in the place where they were registered to vote in the Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for example, if they are registered in Angeles City, they could not vote for a mayor in Naga City.

In other words, if that qualified voter is registered in Angeles City, then he can vote only for the local and national candidates in Angeles City. I just want to make that clear for the record.

MR. REGALADO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Regalado say?

MR. REGALADO. I just want to make a note on the statement of Commissioner Suarez that this envisions Filipinos residing abroad. The understanding in the amendment is that the Filipino is temporarily abroad. He may not be actually residing abroad; he may just be there on a business trip. It just so happens that the day before the elections he has to fly to the United States, so he could not cast his vote. He is temporarily abroad, but not residing there. He stays in a hotel for two days and comes back. This is not limited only to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad. But as long as he is temporarily abroad on the date of the elections, then he can fall within the prescription of Congress in that situation.

MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for his further clarification. Precisely, we need this clarification on record.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify what we mean by “temporarily abroad,” it need not be on very short trips. One can be abroad on a treaty traders visa. Therefore, when we talk about registration, it is possible that his residence is in Angeles and he would be able to vote for the candidates in Angeles, but Congress or the Assembly may provide the procedure for registration, like listing one’s name, in a registry list in the embassy abroad. That is still possible under the system.

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one clarification if Commissioner Monsod agrees with this.

Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer who reaches the voting age while living abroad and he has never registered here. Where will he register? Will he be a registered voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that child to comply with the registration requirements in an embassy in the United States and his name is then entered in the official registration book in Angeles City, for instance.

FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los Angeles, but a registered voter of a locality here.

MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the Philippines to comply with the registration procedure here.

FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home.

MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the Floor Leader wishes to inquire if there are more clarifications needed from the body.

Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that there are no more registered Commissioners to propose amendments. So I move that we close the period of amendments.

[36] (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions,[37] the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.

Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution entitled, “Suffrage.” It says:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.

Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, “who shall have resided in the Philippines.” They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect on this?

Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of “residence” is synonymous with “domicile.”

As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, “domicile” is the intent to return to one’s home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law.

This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we – that Congress – must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.

If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President.

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: “The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.”

The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is “qualified.” In other words, anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote. And “residents” (sic) is a qualification.

I will lose votes here from permanent residents so-called “green-card holders”, but the Constitution is the Constitution. We cannot compromise on this. The Senate cannot be a party to something that would affect or impair the Constitution.

Look at what the Constitution says – “In the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.”

Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.

I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros where Senator Cayetano lives. We are separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution is. I am not talking even about the Election Code. I am talking about the Constitution.

As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote.

That is why I am raising this point because I think we have a fundamental difference here.

Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember.

The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence – and I think this is so well-entrenched that one need not argue about it – “residency” has been interpreted as synonymous with “domicile.”

But the third more practical reason, Mr. President, is, if we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise – to enfranchise them and empower them to vote.

[38] (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process, to wit:

SEC. 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.

which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:

SEC. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;

b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;

c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is “recognized as such in the host country” because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one’s residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that “all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law” must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes “provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise.”

To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate proceedings discloses another reason why the Senate required the execution of said affidavit. It wanted the affiant to exercise the option to return or to express his intention to return to his domicile of origin and not to preempt that choice by legislation. Thus:

Senator Villar. Yes, we are going back.

It states that: “For Filipino immigrants and those who have acquired permanent resident status abroad,” a requirement for the registration is the submission of “a Sworn Declaration of Intent to Return duly sworn before any Philippine embassy or consulate official authorized to administer oath…”

Mr. President, may we know the rationale of this provision? Is the purpose of this Sworn Declaration to include only those who have the intention of returning to be qualified to exercise the right of suffrage? What if the Filipino immigrant has no purpose of returning? Is he automatically disbarred from exercising this right to suffrage?

Senator Angara. The rationale for this, Mr. President, is that we want to be expansive and all-inclusive in this law. That as long as he is a Filipino, no matter whether he is a green-card holder in the U.S. or not, he will be authorized to vote. But if he is already a green-card holder, that means he has acquired permanent residency in the United States, then he must indicate an intention to return. This is what makes for the definition of “domicile.” And to acquire the vote, we thought that we would require the immigrants and the green-card holders . . . Mr. President, the three administration senators are leaving, maybe we may ask for a vote [Laughter].

Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at hand. The rationale for the requirement that an immigrant or a green-card holder should file an affidavit that he will go back to the Philippines is that, if he is already an immigrant or a green-card holder, that means he may not return to the country any more and that contradicts the definition of “domicile” under the law.

But what we are trying to do here, Mr. President, is really provide the choice to the voter. The voter, after consulting his lawyer or after deliberation within the family, may decide “No, I think we are risking our permanent status in the United States if we file an affidavit that we want to go back.” But we want to give him the opportunity to make that decision. We do not want to make that decision for him. [39] (Emphasis supplied)

The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green card holders are disqualified to run for any elective office finds no application to the present case because the Caasi case did not, for obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rights of Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents in their host countries.

In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189, they may still be considered as a “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” upon fulfillment of the requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their right of suffrage.

It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to “resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return “shall be cause for the removal” of their names “from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.”

Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise disqualified by law, who has not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not actually abandoned his/her intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to register and vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishments of the place which has jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean election.

Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:

SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia. –

11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application for registration has been approved, including those previously registered under Republic Act No. 8189, shall, in every national election, file with the officer of the embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment authorized by the Commission, a sworn written application to vote in a form prescribed by the Commission. The authorized officer of such embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment shall transmit to the Commission the said application to vote within five (5) days from receipt thereof. The application form shall be accomplished in triplicate and submitted together with the photocopy of his/her overseas absentee voter certificate of registration.

11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by mail to, the embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment, which has jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections.

11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the overseas absentee voting processes shall be made available at no cost to the overseas absentee voter.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.

Petitioner’s speculative apprehension that the implementation of Section 5(d) would affect the credibility of the elections is insignificant as what is important is to ensure that all those who possess the qualifications to vote on the date of the election are given the opportunity and permitted to freely do so. The COMELEC and the Department of Foreign Affairs have enough resources and talents to ensure the integrity and credibility of any election conducted pursuant to R.A. No. 9189.

As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his undertaking to return to the Philippines, the penalty of perpetual disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d) would suffice to serve as deterrence to non-compliance with his/her undertaking under the affidavit.

Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of “immigrants” renege on their promise to return, the result of the elections would be affected and could even be a ground to contest the proclamation of the winning candidates and cause further confusion and doubt on the integrity of the results of the election. Indeed, the probability that after an immigrant has exercised the right to vote, he shall opt to remain in his host country beyond the third year from the execution of the affidavit, is not farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of a legislative exercise. As expressed in Tañada vs. Tuvera,[40] the Court is not called upon to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find it impractical.

Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has addressed the expected problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under Section 9, should a registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two consecutive national elections, his name may be ordered removed from the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.

Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what happens to the votes cast by the qualified voters abroad who were not able to return within three years as promised? What is the effect on the votes cast by the non-returnees in favor of the winning candidates? The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who failed to return within three years shall not be invalidated because they were qualified to vote on the date of the elections, but their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the names of the immigrants or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and their permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does not find Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.

B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:

SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. –

. . . . . . . . .

18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:

SEC. 4 . . .

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

. . .

which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president.

The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the President and Vice-President.[41]

Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the matter.

Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency.

Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president.

In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:

18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . . [Emphasis supplied]

clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied)

He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators.

It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. It agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and regulations has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr.[42] where this Court held that the power of the COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its power to implement regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C[43] of the Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.

The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis-à-vis its rule-making power, to wit:

SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. –

17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:

a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;

b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and

c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.

Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the independence of constitutional commissions.

The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the Constitution on Legislative Department that would as much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by the principles of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of all others.

The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 and portions of Section 17.1 are unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this question raised by petitioner.

However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis-à-vis the independence of the COMELEC, as a constitutional body.

R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:

SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. – The Commission shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.

. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of Congress to “monitor and evaluate the implementation” of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation.

However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to “review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations” (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be “independent.”

Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that “[w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government.”[44] In an earlier case, the Court elucidated:

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created – free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically – not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.

[45] (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body “except those specifically granted by the Constitution,” that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings.[46] In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.

By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to “issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act.” This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law – the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.[47] Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that “[t]he Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval,” and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that “[i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission,” whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.

Similarly, the phrase, “subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee” in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, “only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee” found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189.[48] Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.

During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to adopt the separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as part of the ponencia on the unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 insofar as they relate to the creation of and the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”

b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”

c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;” and

d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission” of the same law;

for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.

The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.

Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., and Corona, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Tinga, J., no part.

Bellosillo, and Carpio, JJ., see concurring opinion.

Puno, Ynares-Santiago, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion. On official leave.

Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., see separate opinion.

Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., see separate (concurring) opinion.

[1] President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved the law on 13 February 2003. It was published in the 16 February 2003 of Today and Daily Tribune.

[2] PHILCONSA vs. Mathay, 124 Phil. 890 (1966); 18 SCRA 300, 306.

[3] Id., citing PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, 122 Phil. 894 (1965).

[4] Sanidad vs. COMELEC, L-44640, 12 October 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 358-359 citing Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960).

[5] G.R. No. 81311, 30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 371, 378.

[6] Id., p. 378 cited in Tatad vs. The Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 359 (1997).

[7] 338 Phil. 546, 574 (1997).

[8] Separate Opinion of Kapunan, J. in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000, 347 SCRA 128, 256.

[9] Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51, 58-59.

[10] See: Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 27833, 18 April 1969, 27 SCRA 835.

[11] Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr. 232 SCRA 110 (1994) and Basco vs. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52 (1991).

[12] G.R. No. 88831, 8 November 1990, 191 SCRA 229.

[13] Petition, p. 7.

[14] Id., p. 9.

[15] Per Comment and Memorandum filed by Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV, Law Department, COMELEC.

[16] 199 SCRA 692, 713 (1991).

[17] Comment, p. 9 citing Joaquin G. Bernas, Today, 5 February 2003.

[18] 318 Phil. 329 (1995); 248 SCRA 300.

[19] 96 Phil. 294 (1954).

[20] Comment, pp. 11-12.

[21] Caasi Case, supra.

[22] Comment, p. 13.

[23] Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 335 Phil. 82, 101 (1997).

[24] L-47771, 11 March 1978, 82 SCRA 30, 55 citing People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 95 (1937).

[25] Salas vs. Hon. Jarencio, 150-B Phil. 670, 690 (1972) citing Morfe vs. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, 31 January 1968, 22 SCRA 424.

[26] 82 Phil. 771, 775 (1949).

[27] Separate opinion of Vitug, J. in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, supra, p. 387, citing Marcelino vs. Cruz, Jr., L-42428, 18 March 1983, 121 SCRA 51.

[28] Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, supra, p. 56.

[29] 29 C.J.S. 575-577.

[30] 1 WORDS AND PHRASES 264 citing Savant vs. Mercadal, 66 So. 961, 962, 136 La. 248.

[31] 318 Phil. 329 (1995); 248 SCRA 300.

[32] Id., pp. 323-324.

[33] II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, pp. 11-12 (19 July 1986).

[34] Id., p. 33.

[35] Id., pp. 34-35.

[36] Id., pp. 35-36.

[37] Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, 56.

[38] TRANSCRIPTS OF SENATE PROCEEDINGS (1 October 2002), pp. 10-12.

[39] Transcripts of Senate Proceedings (6 August 2002), pp. 30-31.

[40] 146 SCRA 446, 454 (1986) cited in Garcia vs. Corona, 321 SCRA 218 (1999) and Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. vs. Trajano, 310 SCRA 354 (1999).

[41] Comment, p. 15.

[42] G.R. No. 104848, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 253.

[43] SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

. . .

[44] Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, 107 (1949).

[45] Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 294-295 (1941), cited in Espino vs. Zaldivar, 129 Phil. 451, 474 (1967).

[46] Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126, 129 (1949).

[47] In Grego vs. COMELEC (340 Phil. 591, 606 [1997]), the Court said: “The COMELEC as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality.”

[48] SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. –

17.1 . . . Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:

a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;

b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and,

c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.

Conrado de Rama vs. Court of Appeals (FULLTEXT)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 131136. February 28, 2001]

CONRADO L. DE RAMA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION), ELADIO MARTINEZ, DIVINO DE JESUS, MORELL AYALA, ARISTEO CATALLA, DAISY PORTA, FLORDELIZA ORIASEL, GRACIELA GLORY, FELECIDAD ORINDAY, MA. PETRA MUFFET LUCE, ELSA MARINO, BERNARDITA MENDOZA, JANE MACATANGAY, ADELFO GLODOVIZA and FLORINO RAMOS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees, namely:

NAME POSITION DATE OF APPOINTMENT

Eladio Martinez Registration Officer I June 1, 1995

Divino de Jesus Bookbinder III June 1, 1995

Morell Ayala Accounting Clerk III June 16, 1995

Daisy Porta Clerk IV June 27, 1995

Aristeo Catalla Gen. Services Officer June 19, 1995

Elsa Marino Mun. Agriculturist June 19, 1995

Gracella Glory Bookkeeper II June 27, 1995

Ma. Petra Muffet Lucce Accounting Clerk III June 27, 1995

Felicidad Orindag Accounting Clerk II June 27, 1995

Bernardita Mendoza Agricultural Technologist June 27, 1995

Flordeliza Oriazel Clerk I June 27, 1995

Jane Macatangay Day Care Worker I June 27, 1995

Adolfo Glodoviza Utility Worker II June 27, 1995

Florencio Ramos Utility Foreman June 27, 1995[1]

Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. (Underscoring supplied)

While the matter was pending before the CSC, three of the above-named employees, namely: Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries, alleging that although their appointments were declared permanent by Conrado Gulim, Director II of the CSC Field Office based in Quezon, petitioner de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits pursuant to Office Order No. 95-01, which was issued on June 30, 1995, wherein the appointments of the said fourteen (14) employees were recalled.

Based on the documents submitted by Marino, Ayala and Oriazel, the Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division of the CSC issued an Order[2] finding that since the claimants-employees had assumed their respective positions and performed their duties pursuant to their appointments, they are therefore entitled to receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their positions. Citing Rule V, Section 10 of the Omnibus Rules[3] which provides, in part, that “if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission,” the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division ruled that the said employees cannot be deprived of their salaries and benefits by the unilateral act of the newly-assumed mayor.

On April 30, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC also cited Rule V, Sections 9 and 10 of the Omnibus Rules, and declared that the appointments of the said employees were issued in accordance with pertinent laws. Thus, the same were effective immediately, and cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until disapproved by the CSC. The CSC also dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out that the Constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. Thus, the CSC opined, “the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.”[4]

The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CSC’s Resolution, as well as the Order of the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division, averring that the CSC was without jurisdiction: (1) to refuse to revoke the subject appointments; and (2) to uphold the validity of said appointments, even assuming that there was failure to present evidence that would prove that these appointments contravened existing laws or rules. He also posited that the CSC erred in finding the appointments valid despite the existence of circumstances showing that the same were fraudulently issued and processed.

On November 21, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The CSC reiterated its ruling that:

In the absence of any showing that these alleged midnight appointments were defective in form and in substance, nor is there evidence presented to show that subject appointments were issued in contravention of law or rules, these appointments are deemed valid and in effect.

x x x x x x x x x

Mayor de Rama failed to present evidence that subject appointments should be revoked or recalled because of any of the abovementioned grounds enumerated. As a matter of fact, said appointments were even approved by the Head, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena City when submitted for attestation. In the absence of a clear showing that these appointments were issued in violation of any of these grounds, the Commission has no other recourse but to uphold their validity. (Underscoring supplied)

The CSC also cited the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Aquino v. Civil Service Commission[5] wherein this Court held that:

It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing. (Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the CSC arrived at the erroneous conclusion after it ignored his “supplement to the consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration” wherein he laid out evidence showing that the subject appointments were obtained through fraud.

After reviewing the facts and issues raised by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[6] dated May 16, 1997 which held that there was no abuse of the power of appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor.

The Court of Appeals further held that the fact that the appointments of Marino, Ayala, Ramos, Mendoza and Glory were made more than four (4) months after the publication of the vacancies to which they were appointed is of no moment. Setting aside petitioner’s suppositions, the Court of Appeals ruled that Republic Act No. 7041 does not provide that every appointment to the local government service must be made within four (4) months from publication of the vacancies. It cited Section 80 of said Act, to wit:

Section 80. Public Notice of Vacancy: Personnel Selection Board. (a) Whenever a local chief executive decides to fill a vacant career position, there shall be posted notices of the vacancy in at least three (3) conspicuous public places in the local government unit concerned for a period of not less than fifteen (15) days.

(b) There shall be established in every province, city or municipality a personnel selection board to assist the local chief executive in the judicious and objective selection of personnel for employment as well as for promotion, and in the formulation of such policies as would contribute to employee welfare.

(c) The personnel selection board shall be headed by the local sanggunian concerned. A representative of the Civil Service Commission, if any, and the personnel officer of the local government unit concerned shall be ex officio members of the board.[7]

Likewise, neither did the CSC’s own Circular Order No. 27, Section 7, Series of 1991, require that vacant positions published in a government quarterly must be filled up before the advent of the succeeding quarter.

On the basis of all the foregoing findings, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the petition for review.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the appellate court erred in upholding the CSC’s resolutions despite the following defects:

I. No screening process and no criteria were adopted by the Personnel Selection Board in nominating the respondents;

II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public places of notice of vacancy as required by the rules and the law;

III. Merit and fitness requirements were not observed by the selection board and by the appointing authority as required by the Civil Service rules;

IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the appointments of respondents.[8]

In a Resolution dated October 20, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari on the following assigned errors:

I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS CORRECT IN NOT UPHOLDING THE PETITIONERS RECALL OF THE APPOINTMENTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE FACE OF FRAUD AND VIOLATION OF RULES AND LAWS ON ISSUANCE OF APPOINTMENTS.

II. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTICULAR GROUNDS NAMELY:

I. No screening process and no criteria were adopted by the Personnel Selection Board in nominating the respondents;

II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public places of notice of vacancy as required by the rules and the law;

III. Merit and fitness requirements were not observed by the selection board and by the appointing authority as required by the Civil Service rules;

IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the appointments of respondents.

ARE NEW ISSUES BECAUSE THE GROUNDS FOR RECALL OF THE APPOINTMENTS BY THE PETITIONER WERE PRECISELY THE VIOLATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON ISSUANCE OF APPOINTMENTS AS RAISED BEFORE THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.

Petitioner assails the findings of both the CSC and the Court of Appeals for being contrary to law and not being supported by the evidence on record.

This argument is too specious to be given credence. The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were “midnight appointments” that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were, to his personal belief, “midnight appointments” which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make.

Even in petitioner’s consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration, he did not make any assertion that these appointments were violative of civil service rules and procedures. Indeed, he harped on the CSC’s alleged lack of jurisdiction to refuse to recall the subject appointments. After first invoking the authority of the CSC to approve or affirm his act, he then contradicted himself by arguing that the CSC had no jurisdiction to do so, but only after the CSC had ruled that the recall was without legal basis. He emphasized that he alone has sole discretion to appoint and recall the appointment of municipal employees, an authority which, he stressed, the CSC cannot usurp. Yet, nowhere in said pleading did he cite any other ground, much less present proof that would warrant the recall of said appointments.

Perhaps realizing the weakness of his arguments, albeit belatedly, petitioner filed a supplement to the appeal and motion for reconsideration where, for the very first time, he alleged that the appointments were fraught with irregularities for failing to comply with CSC rules and regulations. Nevertheless, the CSC overruled petitioner’s assertions, holding that no new evidence had been presented to warrant a reversal of its earlier resolution.

Thus, in a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, petitioner questioned the CSC’s conclusion because it had ignored the allegations and documents he presented in the supplement to his earlier consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration. He argued that these form part of the records of the case and that the CSC erred in failing to consider the assertions he raised therein. The appellate court, however, agreed with the CSC when it ruled that the documents presented by petitioner in the supplemental pleading did not constitute “new evidence” that would convince the CSC to reverse its earlier ruling. In fine, the Court of Appeals, as did the CSC, simply dismissed petitioner’s allegations and documents attached to the supplemental pleading for they did not constitute new evidence that a court, board or tribunal may entertain.

Herein lies the inconsistency of petitioner’s arguments. He faults the Court of Appeals and the CSC for ignoring his supplemental pleading, while at the same time arguing that the grounds for recall such as violations of laws and regulations on issuance of appointments are not new issues because he had timely raised them before the CSC.

There is no question that parties may file supplemental pleadings to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, but which should not entirely substitute the latter.[9] The propriety and substance of supplemental pleadings are prescribed under Rule 10, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading.

Supplemental pleadings must be with reasonable notice, and it is discretionary upon the court or tribunal to allow the same or not. Thus, the CSC was under no obligation to admit the supplemental pleading, or even to consider the averments therein.

Secondly, a supplemental pleading must state transactions, occurrences or events which took place since the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed. In the instant case, petitioner alleged fraud and irregularities that supposedly occurred contemporaneous to the execution of the appointments. They should have been raised at the very first opportunity. They are not new events which petitioner could not have originally included as grounds for the recall of the appointments.

Accordingly, the CSC, as well as the Court of Appeals, found that the allegations in his supplemental pleading did not constitute “new evidence” that can be the proper subject of a supplemental pleading. These were old facts and issues which he failed to raise earlier. Consequently, the CSC and the Court of Appeals did not err in refusing to give credence to the supplemental pleading.

Be that as it may, these alleged irregularities were considered by the CSC and the Court of Appeals as new issues which were raised for the first time on appeal. It is rather too late for petitioner to raise these issues for the first time on appeal. It is well-settled that issues or questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[10] We have consistently held that matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time.[11] To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly in the supplemental pleading to the appeal at this very late stage in the proceedings would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[12]

The grounds for the recall of the appointments that petitioner raised in his supplemental pleading to the consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration are that: (1) the rules on screening of applicants based on adopted criteria were not followed; (2) there was no proper posting of notice of vacancy; and (3) the merit and fitness requirements set by the civil service rules were not observed. These are grounds that he could have stated in his order of recall, but which he did not. Neither did he raise said grounds in his original appeal, but only by way of a supplemental pleading. Failure of the petitioner to raise said grounds and to present supporting documents constitute a waiver thereof, and the same arguments and evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal before the CSC, nor in the Court of Appeals, and much less in a petition for review before the Supreme Court.[13] In fine, the raising of these factual issues for the first time in a pleading which is supplemental only to an appeal is barred by estoppel.[14]

Petitioner asks this Court to appreciate and consider these factual issues. It must be recalled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact.[15] That is, of course, unless the factual findings assailed by petitioner are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[16]

A thorough perusal of the records reveal that the CSC’s ruling is supported by the evidence and the law. The fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed following two meetings of the Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995. There is no showing that any of the private respondents were not qualified for the positions they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already assumed their appointive positions even before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor. Consequently, their appointments took effect immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner.

It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption of the position in the civil service, “he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing.”[17] Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing.[18]

Petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming the position of town mayor was to issue Office Order No. 95-01 which recalled the appointments of the private respondents. There was no previous notice, much less a hearing accorded to the latter. Clearly, it was petitioner who acted in undue haste to remove the private respondents without regard for the simple requirements of due process of law. In doing so, he overstepped the bounds of his authority. While he argues that the appointing power has the sole authority to revoke said appointments, there is no debate that he does not have blanket authority to do so. Neither can he question the CSC’s jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the recall.

Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.” Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations.[19]

Moreover, Section 10 of the same rule provides:

Sec. 10. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than he date of its issuance.

Section 20 of Rule VI also provides:

Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the following grounds:

(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan;

(b) Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board;

(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or

(d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-cited grounds. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these were “midnight appointments.” The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.

If ever there were other procedural or legal requirements that were violated in implementing the appointments of the private respondents, the same were not seasonably brought before the Civil Service Commission. These cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42896 affirming CSC Resolutions Nos. 96-2828 and 96-7527 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., I concur for the reason that in this case bad faith cannot be presumed.

Puno, J., I concur on the ground that evidence of bad faith is weak.

Vitug, J., I concur; I perceive no clear irregularities in the appointments.

Mendoza, J., please see dissent.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., join the dissent of Justice Mendoza.

[1] Exhibit “1-A”, CSC Resolution No. 96-2828, Rollo, p. 40.

[2] Exhibit “1”, Order dated January 15, 1996 penned by Director Teresita R. Ochoco.

[3] Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, and other pertinent civil service laws.

[4] Supra., Exh. “1-A”, p. 41.

[5] G.R. No. 92403, 208 SCRA 240, 248 (1992).

[6] Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña, ponente; Associate Justices Artemon D. Luna and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring.

[7] Ibid., Rollo, pp. 34-35.

[8] Court of Appeals Resolution dated October 20, 1997, Rollo, p. 37.

[9] Shoemart, Inc. v. CA, 190 SCRA 189, 196 (1990).

[10] Heirs of Pascasio Uriarte v. CA, 284 SCRA 511, 517 (1998); Cheng v. Genato, 300 SCRA 722, 737 (1998).

[11] Salafranca v. Philamlife Village Homeowners Association, Inc., 300 SCRA 469, 480 (1998).

[12] San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. CA, 296 SCRA 631, 649 (1998).

[13] Reyes v. CA, 281 SCRA 277, 286 (1997).

[14] Sanchez v. CA, 279 SCRA 647, 678-679 (1997).

[15] Linzag v. CA, 291 SCRA 304, 321 (1998).

[16] Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. CA, 291 SCRA 385, 392 (1998).

[17] Mauna v. Civil Service Commission, 232 SCRA 388, 398 (1994).

[18] Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240, 248 (1992).

[19] Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, 237 SCRA 184, 200 (1994).

Rogelio Torayno Sr. vs. Comelec and Emano (FULLTEXT)

[G.R. No. 137329. August 9, 2000]

ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M. SERIÑO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y. EMANO, respondents.

En banc

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers’ qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has registered as voter in the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed “a stranger or newcomer” when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be liberally construed to give effect to the popular mandate.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the January 18, 1999 Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc in SPA No. 98-298, which upheld the July 14, 1998 Resolution[2] of the Comelec First Division. The assailed Resolutions ruled that Private Respondent Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum period of residence to be eligible to vote in Cagayan de Oro City, as well as be voted mayor thereof.

The Facts

The pertinent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows.

During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.

On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.

Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998, along with Emano, was Erasmo B. Damasing, counsel of herein petitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr., Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Seriño, all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec, docketed as SPA No. 98-298, in which they sought the disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the Comelec proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city mayor. Thus, on May 29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition before the Comelec, this time for quo warranto,[3] in which they sought (1) the annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2) the proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next highest number of votes, as the duly elected mayor of the city.

In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the Comelec First Division denied the Petition for Disqualification. Upon petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Consolidation, the two cases were consolidated.[4]

Ruling of the Comelec

As earlier stated, the Comelec en banc upheld the findings and conclusions of the First Division, holding that “[t]he records clearly show that the respondent is an actual resident of Cagayan de Oro City for such a period of time necessary to qualify him to run for mayor therein. This fact is clearly established by the respondent having a house in the city which has been existing therein since 1973 and where his family has been living since then.”

Additionally, it ruled:

“There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial official from residing and/or registering as a voter in a highly urbanized city whose residents are not given the right to vote for and be elected to a position in the province embracing such highly urbanized city as long as he has complied with the requirements prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter.

“Neither can the list of voters submitted as evidence for the petitioners showing that the respondent was a registered voter as of March 13, 1995 in Precinct No. 12, Barangay Poblacion, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental bolster the petitioner’s argument that the respondent is not a resident [or a] registered voter in Cagayan de Oro City since registration in said Precinct No. 12 does not preclude the respondent from registering anew in another place.”

Hence, this recourse[5] before this Court.

Issues

In their Memorandum,[6] petitioners submit that the main issue is whether the “Comelec gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolutions.” Allegedly, the resolution of this issue would depend on the following:[7]

“1. Whether or not private respondent Emano’s

(a) remaining as governor of Misamis Oriental until he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City on March 25, 1998 in the May 11, 1998 election;

(b) asserting under oath [that he was] qualified to act as governor of said province until said date; and

(c) admitting, in sworn statements, [that he was] a resident of Misamis Oriental,

precluded him from acquiring a bona fide domicile of choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro City prior to the May 11, 1998 elections, as to disqualify him for being a candidate for city mayor of said City.

2. Differently stated, whether or not Emano’s securing a residence certificate in Cagayan de Oro City, holding offices as governor of Misamis Oriental in the Capitol Building located in Cagayan de Oro City and having a house therein where [he had] stay[ed] during his tenure as governor, and registering as a voter in said City in June 1997, would be legally sufficient, as against the undisputed facts above enumerated, to constitute a change of his domicile of birth in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental in favor of a new domicile of choice in Cagayan de Oro City for at least one (1) year for purposes of qualifying him to run for city mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.

3. Whether or not Erasmo Damasing, the candidate for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City in the May 11, 1998 elections, who received the second highest number of votes, can be declared winner, considering that respondent Emano was disqualified to run for and hold said office and considering that his disqualification or ineligibility had been extensively brought to the attention and consciousness of the voters prior to the May 11, 1998 election as to attain notoriety, notwithstanding which they still voted for him.”

Petitioners are seeking the resolution of essentially two questions: (1) whether private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof; and (2) if not, whether Erasmo Damasing, the candidate who had received the second highest number of votes, should be proclaimed mayor of the city.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Preliminary Matter: Locus Standi of Petitioners

Although not raised by the parties, the legal standing of the petitioners was deliberated upon by the Court. We note that petitioners pray, among others, for judgment “declaring Atty. Erasmo B. Damasing as entitled to be proclaimed winner as mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections in Cagayan de Oro City.”[8] And yet, Damasing is not a party to the instant “Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule[s] 64 and 65″ brought before us.

Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be brought only by (1) the solicitor general or (2) a public prosecutor or (3) a person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.[9] A reading of the Rules shows that petitioners, none of whom qualify under any of the above three categories, are without legal standing to bring this suit.

However, the present Petition finds its root in two separate cases filed before the Comelec: (1) SPC 98-298 for disqualification and (2) EPC 98-62 for quo warranto. Under our election laws and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, any voter may file a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law,[10] or to contest the election of a city officer on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic.[11] The petitioners herein, being “duly-registered voters” of Cagayan de Oro City, therefore satisfy the requirement of said laws and rules.[12]

Main Issue: Residence Qualification for Candidacy

Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his domicile in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, not in Cagayan de Oro City, as allegedly shown by the following facts: (1) he had run and won as governor of the province of Misamis Oriental for three consecutive terms immediately preceding the 1998 elections; (2) in the pleadings he filed in connection with an election protest against him relating to the 1995 election, he had stated that he was a resident of Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental; (3) he had fully exercised the powers and prerogatives of governor until he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25, 1998.

Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor, private respondent remained a resident of the province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification that an elective official must possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent could not have changed his residence to Cagayan de Oro City while he was still governor of Misamis Oriental.

Petitioners further contend that the following were not sufficient to constitute a change of domicile: having a house in Cagayan de Oro City, residing therein while exercising one’s office as governor (the city being the seat of government of the province), securing a residence certificate and registering as voter therein.

Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually and physically resided in Cagayan de Oro City while serving as provincial governor for three consecutive terms, since the seat of the provincial government was located at the heart of that city.[13] He also avers that one’s choice of domicile is a matter of intention, and it is the person concerned who would be in the best position to make a choice. In this case, Emano decided to adopt Cagayan de Oro City as his place of residence after the May 1995 elections. In fact, in January 1997, he secured his Community Tax Certificate at the City Treasurer’s Office, stating therein that he was a resident of 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. During the general registration of voters in June 1997, he registered in one of the precincts of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. This meant that, at the time, Emano had been a voter of the city for the minimum period required by law. No one has ever challenged this fact before any tribunal.

Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto divest him of his position as provincial governor. First, there is no law that prevents an elected official from transferring residence while in office. Second, an elective official’s transfer of residence does not prevent the performance of that official’s duties, especially in private respondent’s case in which the seat of government became his adopted place of residence. Third, as ruled in Frivaldo v. Comelec,[14] the loss of any of the required qualifications for election merely renders the official’s title or right to office open to challenge. In Emano’s case, no one challenged his right to the Office of Provincial Governor when he transferred his residence to Cagayan de Oro City. Naturally, he continued to discharge his functions as such, until he filed his candidacy for mayor in March 1998.

Lastly, Emano urges that the sanctity of the people’s will, as expressed in the election result, must be respected. He is not, after all, a stranger to the city, much less to its voters. During his three terms as governor of Misamis Oriental, his life and actuations have been closely interwoven with the pulse and beat of Cagayan de Oro City.

Public Respondent Comelec relies essentially on Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec[15] in its Memorandum[16]which supports the assailed Resolutions, and which has been filed in view of the solicitor general’s Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment.[17] Thus, the poll body argues that “x x x the fact of residence x x x ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitution’s residency qualification requirement.”

Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials

The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991,[18] which provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:

“SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.”

Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a “stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community.”[19] Such provision is aimed at excluding outsiders “from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.”[20] Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is “best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.”[21]

Facts Showing Change of Residence

In the recent en banc case Mamba-Perez v. Comelec,[22] this Court ruled that private respondent therein, now Representative Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo of the Third District of Cagayan, had duly proven his change of residence from Gattaran, Cagayan (part of the First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (part of the Third District in which he sought election as congressman). He proved it with the following facts: (1) in July 1990, he leased and lived in a residential apartment in Magallanes Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (2) in July 1995, he leased another residential apartment in Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (3) the January 18, 1998 Certificate of Marriage between Aguinaldo and his second wife, Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the Certificate of Live Birth of his second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to him and his family showed that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao for at least one year immediately preceding the May 1998 elections. The Court also stated that it was not “of much importance that in his [Aguinaldo's] certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran.”[23]

In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence.

Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot participate in the provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of parity in representation. The classification of an area as a highly urbanized or independent component city, for that matter, does not completely isolate its residents, politics, commerce and other businesses from the entire province — and vice versa — especially when the city is located at the very heart of the province itself, as in this case.

Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of residence.

Significantly, the Court also declared in Mamba-Perez that “although private respondent declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he ha[s] been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the province of Cagayan.”

Similarly in the instant case, private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for mayor thereof.

To petitioners’ argument that Emano could not have continued to qualify as provincial governor if he was indeed a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue before this Court is whether Emano’s residence in the city qualifies him to run for and be elected as mayor, not whether he could have continued sitting as governor of the province. There was no challenge to his eligibility to continue running the province; hence, this Court cannot make any pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due process prevent us from adjudging matters not properly brought to us. On the basis, however, of the facts proven before the Comelec, we hold that he has satisfied the residence qualification required by law for the mayorship of the city.

We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves — their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former’s qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek.

In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners’ very legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.

Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate

There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro City. He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes.[24] Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate.[25] Verily, in Frivaldo v. Comelec,[26] the Court held:

“x x x [T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.”

In the same vein, we stated in Alberto v. Comelec[27] that “election cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.”

Indeed, “it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.”[28]

In sum, we hold that Respondent Comelec cannot be faulted with abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion in upholding private respondent’s election.

Corollary Issue: Effect of Disqualification of Winner on Second Placer

With the resolution of the first issue in the positive, it is obvious that the second one posited by petitioners has become academic and need not be ruled upon.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.

[1] Rollo, pp. 47-51; signed by Comms. Luzviminda G. Tancangco (officer-in-charge), Manolo B. Gorospe, Julio F. Desamito, Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Japal M. Guiani.

[2] Ibid., pp. 52-55; signed by Comms. Manolo B. Gorospe (presiding commissioner) and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.

[3] Docketed as EPC No. 98-62.

[4] Rollo, pp. 124-25.

[5] This case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Court’s receipt of private respondent’s Memorandum on April 26, 2000.

[6] Rollo, pp. 264 et seq.

[7] Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 9-10, signed by Attys. Ruben E. Agpalo and Renato B. Damasing.

[8] Petition, p. 38; rollo, p. 41.

[9] §§2, 3 & 5, Rule 66, Rules of Court.

[10] §2, Rule 25, Comelec Rules of Procedure, in rel. to §78, Omnibus Election Code, as amended.

[11] §253, Omnibus Election Code, as amended.

[12] The Court desisted from further discussing whether Congress could constitutionally and by law change procedures in mandamus or disqualification proceedings, since such constitutional issue had not specifically been raised.

[13] See private respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Attys. Frederico M. Gapuz and Armando S. Kho who erroneously labeled their law firm as “counsel for the petitioner.”

[14] 174 SCRA 245, June 23, 1989.

[15] 248 SCRA 300, September 18, 1995.

[16] Signed by Atty. Jose P. Balbuena.

[17] Rollo pp. 185-190; this pleading was signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Cecilio O. Estoesta and Sol. Zenaida Hernandez Perez.

[18] RA 7160.

[19] Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300, 313, September 18, 1995 per Kapunan, J.; citing Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil 453, 459, November 24, 1941.

[20] Aquino v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400, 420-21, September 18, 1995, per Kapunan, J.

[21] Ibid.

[22] GR No. 133944, October 28, 1999, per Mendoza, J.

[23] Ibid., p. 10.

[24] To be exact, 29,273. See private respondent’s Memorandum, p. 18. This claim was not disputed by petitioners.

[25] Garay v. Comelec, 261 SCRA 222, 234, August 28, 1996.

[26] Supra, p. 769.

[27] 311 SCRA 215, 222, July 27, 1999, per Romero, J. See also Punzalan v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 702, 720, April 27, 1998.

[28] Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, 771-772, June 28, 1996, per Panganiban, J.