Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 106429

 

 

JOSELITA SALITA,

petitioner,

-versus-

HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS,

in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107,

and ERWIN ESPINOSA,

respondents.

 

Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioner.

Yolanda, Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private respondent.

 

BELLOSILLO, J.:

 

Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity.

 

The issue before us however is not the scope nor even the interpretation of Art. 36 of the Family Code. 1 Rather, the issue is the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification of the petition.

 

The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 7 January 1992. Therein it is alleged that “[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter.” 2 Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. 3 Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that —

 

. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.

 

Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the “assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an averment of ‘ultimate facts,’ as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred . . . .” 4

 

But finding the questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her responsive pleading.

 

Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with us. However, we referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution.

 

On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due course to her petition thus —

 

In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified Salita’s alleged psychological incapacity in his bill of particulars . . .

 

In our view, the aforesaid specification more than satisfies the Rules’ requirement that a complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting a plaintiff’s cause of action. To require more details thereof, to insist on a specification of Salita’s particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding ‘circumstances of time, place and person’ indicating her alleged psychological incapacity would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. To obtain evidentiary details, Salita may avail herself of the different modes of discovery provided by the Rules of Court

(Rules 24 to 28).

 

Whether Espinosa’s averments in his bill of particulars constitute psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code is a question that may be resolved in a motion to dismiss or after trial on the merits of the case, not in a motion for bill of particulars. And certainly, that matter cannot be resolved in the present petition. 5

 

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita Salita questioning the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying due course to her petition.

 

Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not call for information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.

 

Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires at this point. He defines ultimate facts as —

 

. . . important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make upon the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate facts upon the existence of which the entire cause of action rests. 6

 

Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts . . . 7

 

Private respondent further argues that “[c]onclusions of law and evidentiary matters need not be stated in the complaint. The rules of pleading limit the statement of the cause of action only to such operative facts as would give rise to the right of action of the plaintiff to obtain relief against the wrongdoer. The details of probative matter or particulars of evidence, statements of law, inferences and arguments need not be stated.” 8

 

In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.

 

A complaint only needs to state the “ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action.” 9 Ultimate facts has been defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support.” 10 As stated by private respondent, “[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established.” It refers to “the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts.” And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. 11 A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other means. 12

 

We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private respondent’s cause of action against her thus —

 

. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.

 

On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that “she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . . ” Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. 13 For sure, the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars. 14

 

We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic 15 where we said —

 

Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.

 

The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case. That ruling involves alleged “misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power.” The respondents therein pray for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. There, the alleged illicit acts should be fully documented. The instant case, on the other hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to document each and every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the complaining spouse will have to prove his case, but that will not come until trial begins.

 

Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order the immediate resumption of the annulment proceeding which have already been delayed for more than two years now, even before it could reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should be immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other.

 

A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code. 16 We do not see the need to define or limit the scope of the provision. Not in this case, at least. For, we are not called upon to do so, the actual controversy being the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. To interpret the provision at this juncture would be to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed. Besides, it appears that petitioner in her memorandum has demonstrated a good grasp of what Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice Sempio-Diy, formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family code, explains —

 

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 17

 

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated 21 July 1992 is AFFIRMED.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

 

# Footnotes

 

1 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization (As amended by E.O. 227).

 

2 Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed by Erwin Espinosa, par. 3; Rollo, p. 20.

 

3 Order issued by Judge Delilah Magtolis, Regional Trial Court, Br. 107, Quezon City; Rollo, p. 26.

 

4 Opposition to the Supposed Bill of Particulars Submitted by Petitioner, p. 2, par. 6; Rollo, p. 30.

 

5 Resolution penned by Associate Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, concurred in by Associate Justices Fidel P. Purisima and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., of the Ninth Division.

 

6 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 435.

 

7 Id., citing 71 C.J.S. 34.

 

8 Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 10; Rollo, p. 197.

 

9 Sec. 3, Rule 6, Rules of Court.

 

10 Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed., citing McDuffie v. California Tehama Land Corporation, 138 Cal. App. 245, 32 P.2d 385, 386.

 

11 Paras, Rules of Court Annotated, Vol. I, Second Ed., 1989, p. 320.

 

12 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 397, citing

W.J. Dillmer Transfer Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 8 Fed, Rules Service,

p. 163, US Dist. Ct., W.D. Pa., 6 October 1944.

 

13 Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed., citing People ex rel. Hudson & M.R. Co. v. Sexton, Supp., 44 N.Y. S.2d 884, 885.

 

14 Paras, See Note 11, citing Graffius v. Weather-Seal Inc., 9 Fed. Rules Service 12e, 231, Case No. 13.

 

15 G.R. No. 89114, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 428.

 

16 See Note. 1.

 

17 Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988, p. 37.

Republipublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

 

THIRD DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 149498             May 20, 2004

 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.

 

D E C I S I O N

 

CORONA, J.:

 

Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.

 

On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.

 

Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippinesfor a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.

 

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japanand promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.

 

The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.

 

On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondent�s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.

 

On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

 

The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.

 

SO ORDERED.4

 

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio�s psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:

 

It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondent�s mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.5

 

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:

 

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

 

SO ORDERED.6

 

The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippinesbut he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.

 

The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to “observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support” pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:

 

But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7

 

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a “mixed marriage,” the husband being a Japanese national.

 

Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:

 

I

 

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondent�s failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10

 

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.

 

The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.

 

We rule in favor of petitioner.

 

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12

 

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:

 

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

 

In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

 

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

 

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

 

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do�s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

 

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

 

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

 

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

 

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

 

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)

 

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.”14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party�s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.15

 

We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio�s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.

 

Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.

 

We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio�s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent�s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

 

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18

 

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a “mixed marriage,” the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

 

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.

 

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

 

Footnotes

 

* Acting Chief Justice

 

1 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, and concurred in by Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Hilarion Aquino; Rollo, pp. 24-31.

 

2 Second Division.

 

3 Penned by Judge Rogelio Angeles; Rollo, pp. 32-33.

 

4 Rollo, p. 33.

 

5 Rollo, p. 52.

 

6 Rollo, p. 30.

 

7 Rollo, p. 29.

 

8 268 SCRA 198 [1997].

 

9 240 SCRA 20 [1995].

 

10 Rollo, p. 14.

 

11 Article II, Section 12; and, Article XV, Sections 1 & 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

 

12 Republic of the Philippinesvs. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425 [2001] citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Hernandez, 320 SCRA 76 [1999].

 

13 Supra, Note 8, pp. 209-212.

 

14 Supra, Note 9, p. 33.

 

15 Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, 764 [2000].

 

16 Article 55 (10) of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:

 

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

 

x x x           x x x           x x x

 

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

 

17 Supra� Note 8, p. 210.

 

18 Ibid., pp. 211-212.

 

19 356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001].

320 SCRA 76, December 08, 1999, J. Mendoza

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Lucita Estrella married Mario Hernandez on January 1, 1981 adn they begot three (3) children. On July 10, 1992, Lucita filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City, a petition for annulment of marriage under Article 36 alleging that from the time of their marriage, Mario failed to perform his obligation to support the family, devoting most of this time drinking, had affairs with many women and cohabiting with another women with whom he had an illegitimate child, and finally abandoning her and the family.

The RTC dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether there was psychological incapacity under Article. 36

RULING:

Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that  private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical.

Private respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute ground for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must e shown that these facts are manifestations of a discolored personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent’s youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held.

Judgment AFFIRMED.

268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, J. Panganiban

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On April 14, 1985,plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to spend more time with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity?

RULING:

There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.

The evidence merely adduce that Roridel and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecendence nor its incurability.

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the  complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity  must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.

4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disablity of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.

6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husbad and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents adn their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Churh in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983.

8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as counsel of the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a  certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

Judgment REVERSED and SET ASIDE.